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A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning in the 
Framework of Corpus Linguistics 
Neal Goldfarb* 
Corpus linguistics is more than just a new tool for legal interpreta-
tion. Work in corpus linguistics has generated new ways of thinking about 
word meaning and about the interpretation of words in context. These 
insights challenge the assumptions that lawyers and judges generally 
make about words and their meaning. Although the words that make up 
a sentence are generally regarded as the basic units of meaning, corpus 
analysis has shown that in many cases, the meaning of a word as it is used 
in a given context is a function, not of the word by itself, but of the word’s 
interaction with that context. In the many instances in which that is the 
case, it will often make sense to regard the basic unit of meaning as a 
multi-word expression that includes not only the word in question but also 
the relevant parts of the context. That basic insight, which grew out 
of  work on the world’s first dictionary based on an electronic corpus, 
opens  the door to new ways for lawyers and judges to analyze issues of 
word  meaning. 
This Article begins by contrasting two themes that run through legal 
interpretation: on the one hand, the view that word meanings are clearly 
delineated abstract entities that exist independently of the use of the word 
in context, and on the other hand, the view that word meanings exist only 
in context. (The Article comes down strongly in support of the latter 
view.) After setting out these two competing themes, the Article introduces 
the phenomenon of collocation—the tendency of certain words to co-occur 
disproportionately with certain other words. The study of collocation 
served as the starting point for the work that ultimately generated the 
new insights into the nature of word meaning.  
 
* Butzel Long, PC; www.LAWnLinguistics.com. My thinking on the issues discussed in this 
paper benefited from discussion at the Law and Corpus Linguistics conference held at BYU in 
April 2016. I want to acknowledge in particular Stephen Mouritsen’s presentation on Muscarello 
and my conversations with Mark Davies and Stefan Th. Gries. The title of this paper is cribbed 
from John Sinclair, Meaning in the Framework of Corpus Linguistics, 20 LEXICOGRAPHICA 
20 (2004). 
© 2017 Neal Goldfarb 
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The Article then describes the development of that work, much of 
which was done as part of creating the first corpus-based dictionary. The 
Article summarizes some of the findings that were made by the lexicog-
raphers, and the conclusions about word meaning that followed from 
those findings. Some of those conclusions may strike readers as radical, 
since they call into question many widely held assumptions about word 
meaning. Finally, in order to demonstrate how the new approach can be 
used in legal interpretation, the Article undertakes a corpus analysis of 
the issue in the well-known case of Muscarello v. United States: whether 
driving to the site of a drug deal with a gun in the glove compartment 
constitutes “carrying a firearm.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION1  
As is shown by the other contributions to this symposium, corpus 
linguistics is a new tool for legal interpretation—one that provides an 
alternative to dictionaries.2 But the significance of corpus linguistics 
for legal interpretation goes beyond the methodological. As I hope to 
show here, work in corpus linguistics (and in particular corpus-based 
lexicography) has generated new ways of thinking about word mean-
ing and about the interpretation of words in context. These insights 
challenge the assumptions that lawyers and judges generally make 
about words and their meaning. 
Those assumptions reflect the way that word meaning is treated in 
the dictionaries that lawyers and judges typically rely on. For example, 
it is assumed that the basic units of meaning are individual words. And 
 
 1. This Article uses the following typographical conventions (all of which are in addition 
to the ordinary uses of the typographic attributes in question): 
Italics are used (rather than quotation marks) to indicate that the italicized word 
or expression is used as an example of a linguistic unit, as in “The plural of 
corpus is corpora.” 
SMALL CAPITALS are used (1) for technical terms from linguistics when they are 
used for the first time, and (2) for references to semantic roles and conceptual 
schemas. 
‘Single quotes’ are used to indicate that the material in question represents the 
meaning of a word or other expression. 
Sans serif is used for excerpts from corpus results. 
 2. See also, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 54–134, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–90 
(Utah 2015) (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); James C. Phillips, 
Daniel M. Ortner & Thomas R. Lee, Corpus Linguistics & Original Public Meaning: A New 
Tool to Make Originalism More Empirical, 126 YALE L.J. F. 21 (2016), http://www.yalelawjour 
nal.org/forum/corpus-linguistics-original-public-meaning; Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The 
Dictionary Is Not A Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Mean-
ing, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915 [hereinafter The Dictionary Is Not A Fortress]. 
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word meanings are seen as discrete entities with (in most cases) 
clear boundaries. 
But things are not that simple. One striking effect of work in cor-
pus lexicography has been to significantly undermine the view of 
words as the basic units of meaning. Under that view, which embodies 
the principle of COMPOSITIONALITY, the meaning of a sentence is de-
termined by the meanings of the individual words and how they are 
grammatically combined.3 But while that can be a useful idealization, 
it glosses over a major complication. Many frequently used words have 
multiple possible meanings, and when such a word is used in a sen-
tence, its meaning depends largely on what the rest of the sentence 
says. So there is a chicken-and-egg problem: how can individual words 
be regarded as basic units of meaning when the meaning of a word in 
a particular context is itself affected by the context? The answer sug-
gested by corpus linguistics is that individual words often are not the 
basic units of meaning. Rather, it makes more sense in many cases to 
conceive of the basic unit of meaning as a phrase or other multiword 
expression. And that makes it necessary to revise our views about 
word meanings. 
Another reason for questioning common views about word mean-
ing is that the boundaries between the meanings of different words, 
or between the different senses of the same word, are often unclear. 
Drawing lines between different word senses is unavoidably subjective, 
as is shown by the fact that the lines are often drawn differently by 
different dictionaries. Although these are not new discoveries—they 
have been known to lexicographers at least as far back as Samuel 
Johnson4—work in corpus linguistics has given them new force  
and  prominence. 
In discussing these ideas, I will proceed in part by summarizing 
their intellectual history—because the history matters. The crucial pe-
riod in the development of corpus lexicography was the mid-1980s, 
 
 3. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPOSITIONALITY (Markus Werning et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 4. See Patrick Hanks, Johnson and Modern Lexicography, 18 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 
243, 257–59 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson and Modern Lexicography]; SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE B2r, B2v (1st ed. 1755), reprinted in Johnson, Preface 
to the Dictionary (Jack Lynch, ed.), http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/pref 
ace.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2018). 
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when the first dictionary based on data from a computerized corpus 
was published. The dictionary’s editor-in-chief, John Sinclair, was a 
leading figure in the development of corpus linguistics and a pioneer 
in using corpus analysis to investigate the nature of word meaning. 
The ideas that I will discuss here, such as the notion that words are 
not the basic unit of meaning, are to a large extent attributable to 
Sinclair, and the dictionary project he headed served simultaneously 
as a testing ground for those ideas and as a source of further data and 
insights. The dictionary that resulted is widely regarded as a major 
advance in lexicography. So the ideas I will be discussing represent 
more than mere academic theorizing. The theory has been put to a 
practical test and has been shown to have real-world applications. 
In the final portion of the Article, I will demonstrate how the ideas 
I describe can contribute to legal interpretation. I will take a fresh look 
at Muscarello v. United States, which presented the question whether 
driving a car or truck with a firearm in the trunk or glove compartment 
constituted “carrying” the firearm.5 Although Muscarello has already 
been the subject of a corpus-based analysis by Steven Mouritsen,6 his 
analysis focused on which of two dictionary senses of the word carry 
was more common, and therefore did not challenge the prevailing 
conception of word meaning. My approach to Muscarello will differ 
from Mouritsen’s in two respects. Rather than look at which diction-
ary sense is more common, I will ask a more open-ended question: 
when viewed without preconceptions, what does the corpus data tell 
us about how the word carry behaves? And I will look at the data 
through the lens of Corpus Pattern Analysis, a corpus-driven lexico-
graphic approach that focuses on multiword patterns rather than on 
individual word meanings. My conclusions, like Mouritsen’s, seriously 
undermine the holding in Muscarello. But more importantly, the 
data  reveals details about the use of carry that are not recorded in  
any dictionary. 
 
 5. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126 (1998). 
 6. The Dictionary is Not a Fortress, supra note 2, at 1958–70; see also Thomas R. Lee & 
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://pa 
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2937468 [hereinafter Judging Ordinary Meaning]. 
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II. WORD MEANING IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
Two contrasting themes run through legal interpretation, both 
having to do with the meanings of words. One is a view that sees word 
meanings as well-delineated abstract entities having an almost Platonic 
existence. The other is a view that word meaning exists only in context 
(although that principle may be honored at least as much in the breach 
as in the observance). To set the stage for discussion of what corpus 
linguistics can tell us about word meaning, I will briefly describe these 
themes, the first of which is this Article’s principal target. 
A. The Dictionary Paradigm 
It has been said that the dictionary is for many people a “guardian 
of absolute and eternal truth[.]”7 For these people “there is, for every 
word, a ‘true’ meaning, that is stored somewhere, and that the job of 
the lexicographer is to find it and copy it in the dictionary.”8 This view 
is analogous to the discredited conception of the common law as be-
ing what Holmes dismissively described as “a brooding omnipresence 
in the sky.”9 Courts often seem to share this attitude; that at least is a 
reasonable inference from cases in which courts have equated ordinary 
meaning with dictionary definitions, or have otherwise treated such 
definitions as definitive.10 
Associated with this view of dictionaries are certain attitudes and 
assumptions about the nature of word meanings, which I will refer to 
collectively as the Dictionary Paradigm. These attitudes and assump-
tions are to a large extent reflected in, and fostered by, the way in 
which the information in dictionaries is presented. 
 
 7. HENRI BÉJOINT, TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN MODERN ENGLISH DICTION-
ARIES 122 (1994), reprinted in MODERN LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 122 (2000) 
[hereinafter TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN MODERN ENGLISH DICTIONARIES]. 
 8. HENRI BÉJOINT, THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH: FROM ORIGINS TO PRESENT 
235 (2010) [hereinafter THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH]; see also TRADITION AND 
INNOVATION IN MODERN ENGLISH DICTIONARIES, supra note 7,  at 122. 
 9. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 10. E.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002–04 (2012); Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2008); Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127–28; MCI Tele-
comms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–28 (1994); Chapman v. United States, 500 
U.S. 453, 461–62 (1991). 
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A dictionary’s structure, with its basic unit being a separate entry 
for each word, conveys the impression that individual words are simi-
larly the basic units of meaning. That assumption would probably 
strike most people as unremarkable, but such a reaction simply con-
firms that most people have internalized the assumption. And as I will 
attempt to show, the assumption should be questioned. 
Many words are POLYSEMOUS, meaning they can be used in a va-
riety of ways, each with its own meaning.11 That is reflected in the fact 
that the dictionary entries for such words are divided into multiple 
separately numbered senses. That format, according to two leading 
lexicographers, rests on some unstated assumptions.12 One assump-
tion, which is congruent with the view of dictionaries as guardians of 
truth, is “that there is a sort of Platonic inventory of senses ‘out 
there.’”13 On this view, word meanings are abstract entities that exist 
independently of the contexts in which they are used. 
Note that the context I am referring to includes the grammatical 
environment in which words occur. Word meaning is seen as residing 
in the domain of dictionaries, and syntax in the domain of grammar 
books. There are of course exceptions: words (and parts of words) 
whose function is primarily grammatical, like of, the, -ed, -ing, and -s. 
But the attention that dictionaries devote to these “function” words 
is insignificant in relation to their overall scope. 
In addition to treating word meanings as abstract entities, diction-
aries assume that each word has exactly as many senses as are listed, 
with each sense being “mutually exclusive and [having] clear bounda-
ries.”14 This “offers the comforting prospect of certainty to linguistic 
inquirers”—an apparently complete menu of each word’s possible 
meanings, from which the user can simply select the one appropriate 
to the situation at hand.15 And fittingly, given that we are talking here 
about word meaning in legal interpretation, the standard definition 
 
 11. See, e.g., Ingrid Lossius Falkum & Agustin Vicente, Polysemy: Current Perspectives and 
Approaches, 157 LINGUA 1, 1 (2015). 
 12. B.T. SUE ATKINS & MICHAEL RUNDELL, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRAC-
TICAL  LEXICOGRAPHY 271–72 (2008) [hereinafter THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL 
LEXICOGRAPHY]. 
 13. Id. at 272. 
 14. Id. 
 15. PATRICK HANKS, LEXICAL ANALYSIS: NORMS AND EXPLOITATIONS 85 (2013) [here-
inafter LEXICAL ANALYSIS]. 
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format reflects the demands of the dictionary’s role in resolving dis-
putes over meaning.16 To perform that function, dictionaries “must 
draw a line around a meaning, so that a use can be classified as on one 
side of the line or the other”; if a dictionary “presents [a word’s] 
meaning as context-dependent or variable or flexible, [it] will be of 
little use for purposes of settling arguments.”17 
The discussion above is not intended as a complete description of 
the Dictionary Paradigm; there are other aspects that are not relevant 
for present purposes.18 And I don’t mean to suggest that the assump-
tions I have described play an active role in every case involving an 
issue of word meaning. But I do think that judges and lawyers deal 
with such issues in a way that is consistent with these assumptions, and 
that the assumptions can influence judges’ decisions and the ways in 
which judges explain those decisions. 
B. Words in Context 
In at least partial counterpoint to the Dictionary Paradigm is the 
principle (described by the Supreme Court as fundamental to both 
statutory interpretation and language itself) that “the meaning of a 
 
 16. Adam Kilgarriff, “I Don’t Believe in Word Senses,” 31 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 91, 
109–10 n.13 (1997) [hereinafter “I Don’t Believe in Word Senses”],  reprinted in PRACTICAL 
LEXICOGRAPHY: A READER 143 n.14 (Thierry Fontenelle ed., 2008) [hereinafter PRACTICAL 
LEXICOGRAPHY: A READER].  
 17. Id. As with much else in lexicography, the dispute-resolution function of dictionaries 
may well trace back to Samuel Johnson. The linguist Geoffrey Nunberg is reported to have 
suggested that the tradition of relying on dictionaries to resolve disputes can be traced to the 
cultural environment in which Johnson worked. That connection is described in the following 
summary of a presentation by Nunberg: 
[T]he development of printed discourse, particularly the new periodicals, in England 
in the early part of the eighteenth century brought about a re-evaluation of the nature 
of meaning. No longer could it be assumed that a disagreement or confusion about a 
word’s meaning could be settled face-to-face, and it seemed at the time that the new 
discourse would only be secure if there was some mutually acceptable authority on 
what words meant. The resolution to the crisis came in the form of Johnson’s Dic-
tionary. Thus, from its inception, the modern dictionary has had a crucial symbolic 
role: it represents a methodology for resolving questions of meaning. 
Id.; see also Geoff Nunberg, The Once and Future Dictionary, (March 17, 1995) (abstract of pre-
sentation at Stanford University Linguistics Department colloquium), http://web.stanford.  
edu/dept/linguistics/colloq/prev/1995/1995mar17.html. 
 18. These issues will be discussed further in the book that I am working on, Thinking 
Like a Linguist: Using Linguistics in Legal Interpretation. 
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word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the 
context in which it is used.”19 Taken at face value, this statement could 
serve to summarize this Article’s thesis. And cases do exist in which 
the court focuses on the kind of context that is relevant here: the im-
mediate linguistic environment in which the word at issue appears.20 
However, the principle is often cited with regard to aspects of context 
that are outside this Article’s concerns, such as statutory structure or 
consistency with other parts of the statute.21 
An argument frequently made by critics of the courts’ reliance on 
dictionaries is that dictionaries deal with word meanings out of con-
text.22 While I agree that the way that courts typically use dictionaries 
is problematic, it seems to me that the critics’ statement of the prob-
lem is not entirely correct. 
As I will explain, what lexicographers try to do in writing defini-
tions is to generalize from the ways that the word in question is used 
out in the world.23 In all of those uses the word is embedded in a 
context. So each definition is an attempt to summarize what those 
instances of meaning-in-context have in common. The problem as I 
see it is not merely that the dictionaries used by judges and lawyers 
present word meanings out of context, but that they do little or noth-
ing to identify the kinds of contexts in which each of the various word 
senses typically appears (a process referred to in linguistics as MAPPING 
word senses to the appropriate kinds of context). In fact, dictionaries 
don’t even suggest that such a mapping is possible. 
 
 19. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993); accord, e.g., Yates v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662–63 (2001). 
 20. See, e.g., Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998) (“It is not the meaning of 
‘for’ we are seeking here, but the meaning of ‘[s]uits for violation of contracts.’” (alteration 
in  original)). 
 21. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 56–57 (1995). 
 22. E.g., James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s 
Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 502–03 
(2013) [hereinafter Oasis or Mirage]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in 
Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67 (1994); A. Raymond Randolph, 
Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 71, 74 (1994); The Dictionary Is Not A Fortress, supra note 2, at 1924–25. For citations 
to the fairly substantial body of scholarship regarding the courts’ use of dictionaries, see Oasis or 
Mirage, supra, at 486–87 nn.3–6. 
 23. See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text. 
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Corpus linguistics makes it possible to deal with the mapping 
problem. The data that corpus linguistics has generated, and the in-
sights that have been drawn from that data, have made it possible to 
think about the mapping issue systematically and to identify what the 
mapping process entails. And the methodologies of corpus linguistics 
provide the means to translate those ideas into practice. 
III. COLLOCATION AND RELATED PHENOMENA:  
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
The branch of corpus linguistics that is most important for legal 
interpretation is corpus lexicography: the use of corpus data in com-
piling dictionaries, and more generally, the use of such data to inves-
tigate word meaning. Although lexicography has long been referred 
to as a form of applied linguistics,24 the fact is that until about thirty 
years ago, lexicography did not pay much attention to linguistics. That 
situation has changed, however, and current lexicographic practice has 
been influenced significantly by linguistics (although without much 
visible effect on the major American dictionaries25). This emerging in-
fluence has come mainly from corpus linguistics, and in particular 
from the study of COLLOCATION. 
Although the term is used to describe a variety of phenomena, 
collocation at its core is “a lexical relation between two or more words 
which have a tendency to co-occur within a few words of each other 
 
  24. See, e.g., Dirk Geeraerts, Types of Semantic Information in Dictionaries, in A 
SPECTRUM OF LEXICOGRAPHY 1, 1 (Robert Ilson ed., 1987); Hans H. Meier, Lexicography as 
Applied Linguistics, in 3 LEXICOGRAPHY: CRITICAL CONCEPTS: LEXICOGRAPHY, METALEXI-
COGRAPHY, AND REFERENCE SCIENCE 307, 307 (R.R.K. Hartmann ed., 2003); Alain Rey, 
Training Lexicographers: Some Problems, in LEXICOGRAPHY: AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL 
PROFESSION 93, 95 (Robert Ilson ed., 1986). 
 25. See, e.g., Patrick Hanks, Lexical Patterns: From Hornby to Huston and Beyond, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE XIII EURALEX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 89, 106 (Elisenda Bernal 
& Janet DeCesaris eds., 2008) [hereinafter Lexical Patterns]; Michael Rundell, Good Old-Fash-
ioned Lexicography: Human Judgment and the Limits of Automation, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND 
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING: A FESTSCHRIFT IN HONOUR OF B.T.S. ATKINS 138, 140 
(Marie-Hélène Corréard ed., 2002). I should note that the reference in the text to “major Amer-
ican dictionaries” is not intended to include the New Oxford American Dictionary, which is 
published by the U.K.-based Oxford University Press and which is based on the Oxford Diction-
ary of English (which covers British English). See Patrick Hanks, Corpus Evidence and Electronic 
Lexicography, in ELECTRONIC LEXICOGRAPHY 57, 62 (Sylviane Granger & Magali Paquot eds., 
2012) [hereinafter Corpus Evidence and Electronic Lexicography]. 
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in running text.”26 In many cases, collocation is “the lexical realization 
of the situational context”27—a reflection of the topic that is being 
discussed. Thus, the most frequent collocates of trial in the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English include murder, fair, lawyers, court, 
jury, judge, and Simpson (O.J., not Homer).28 
 But other collocations are purely linguistic rather than situation-
driven. For example, we say that someone commits a crime, but typi-
cally not that they do or perform or make a crime.29 A more complex 
example is provided by the words strong and powerful. Despite their 
similarity in meaning, the Google Books Ngram Viewer (Amer-
ican  English corpus) reveals that they have different patterns  
of collocation:30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The tendency of the words in the left-hand column to co-occur with 
strong, and of those in the right-hand column to co-occur with pow-
erful, is often referred to as a collocational preference.31 
 
 26. MICHAEL STUBBS, WORDS AND PHRASES: CORPUS STUDIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 
24 (2001); see also JOHN SINCLAIR, CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION 170 (1991) 
[hereinafter CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION]. 
 27. Rosamund Moon, The Analysis of Meaning, in LOOKING UP: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
COBUILD PROJECT IN LEXICAL COMPUTING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLLINS 
COBUILD ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY 86, 92 (J.M. Sinclair ed., 1987) [hereinafter The 
Analysis of Meaning]. 
 28.   See Davies, Mark. (2008-) The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): 
560 million words, 1990–present. Available online at https://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ [hereinafter 
COCA] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).  
 29. This example is taken from THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, su-
pra note 12, at 303.   
 30. The difference between how strong and powerful each behave was first noted in 
M.A.K. Halliday, Lexis as a Linguistic Level, in IN MEMORY OF J. R. FIRTH 148, 150–52 (C. E. 
Bazell et al. eds., 1966) [hereinafter Lexis as a Linguistic Level]. 
 31. In a 2011 Supreme Court case, the author submitted an amicus brief that relied heav-
ily on corpus data regarding collocational preferences. Brief for the Project on Government 
Oversight, the Brechner Ctr. for Freedom of Info., and Tax Analysts as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners, FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279). The brief may have 
strong 
strong wind 
strong liquor 
strong coffee 
strong preference 
strong opposition 
powerful 
powerful hurricane 
powerful engine 
powerful car 
powerful machine 
powerful explosive 
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Words can also have preferences as to the syntactic environments 
in which they appear, and even more importantly, so can the various 
possible meanings of a polysemous word. For example, a given mean-
ing may be more strongly associated with one grammatical form of 
the word than with others.32 And as we will see, the meaning of a 
transitive verb as used in a sentence is often sensitive to the word that 
acts as its direct object.33 Although phenomena such as these are not 
typically referred to as a type of collocation, they are closely related to 
it. In the interest of simplicity, I will use the term to refer not only to 
purely lexical co-occurrence, but also to this kind of lexical/grammat-
ical co-occurrence. 
IV. FROM COLLOCATION TO CORPUS LEXICOGRAPHY 
A. John Sinclair and the Cobuild Project 
Corpus lexicography is relevant to legal interpretation not only 
because of its association with dictionary-making, but also because it 
is a way of studying word meaning. The development of the field was 
a more-or-less direct outgrowth of the study of collocation by British 
linguist John Sinclair. While Sinclair was not the first person to focus 
on collocation,34 he was the first to seriously study it as an aspect of 
linguistic theory.35 
 
influenced the way the opinion was written. See FCC, 562 U.S. at 403. For discussion, see Ben 
Zimmer, The Corpus in the Court: ‘Like Lexis on Steroids,’ ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/the-corpus-in-the-court-like-lexis-
on-steroids/72054/. 
 32. See, e.g., CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 44–51. 
 33. See infra text accompanying note 85. 
 34. The study of collocation began (at least with regard to English) in the 1920s and 
1930s in Japan in the context of teaching English as a foreign language—and in particular in 
connection with creating dictionaries intended for that purpose. See, e.g., A. P. COWIE, ENGLISH 
DICTIONARIES FOR FOREIGN LEARNERS: A HISTORY 2–6, 8–12, 52–58 (1999) [hereinafter 
ENGLISH DICTIONARIES FOR FOREIGN LEARNERS]. Within linguistics, credit for introducing 
the concept of collocation is usually given to John Firth, who in 1951 proposed the idea of 
“meaning by collocation.” J. R. Firth, Modes of Meaning, in ESSAYS AND STUDIES OF THE 
ENGLISH ASSOCIATION 118 (1951), reprinted in J. R. Firth, PAPERS IN LINGUISTICS 190, 194–
95 (1957). However, Firth’s writings on the subject were sketchy at best, and are more im-
portant for having influenced Sinclair than for what they actually say. 
 35. Regarding Sinclair’s work and career, see, for example, Patrick Hanks, John Sinclair 
(1933–2007), EURALEX NEWSL., Summer 2007, in 20 INT’L J. LEXICOGRAPHY 209, 212–13 
(2007) [hereinafter John Sinclair (1933–2007)]; Michael Stubbs, A Tribute to John McHardy 
3.GOLDFARB_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  3:58 PM 
1359 A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning . . .  
 1371 
As first framed (in 1966), the object of study had little if anything 
to do with the meanings of words, but rather was defined as the sta-
tistical patterns of co-occurrence between “lexical items” (which 
might consist of more than a single word).36 Sinclair recognized that 
this would raise “problems which are not likely to yield to anything 
less imposing than a very large computer.”37 In fact, he was at that 
point in the preparatory stage of a project devoted to studying collo-
cation using one of the first computerized corpora of spontaneous 
speech.38 And despite the purely statistical approach Sinclair had  
initially outlined, by the time that project was undertaken, its  
goals included investigating the relationship between collocation  
and meaning.39 
That goal proved to be elusive; according to the report that the 
project generated, the work “tries to define the problem [of the rela-
tionship between collocation and meaning] more carefully, without 
being able to settle the issue.”40 The absence of progress on that issue 
is not surprising, considering the small size of the corpus (135,000 
words).41 The primitive state of the technology in the 1960s was also 
a serious limitation.42 The project was completed in 1970, and for the 
next ten years, Sinclair did no further corpus research, focusing instead 
on technical issues such as improving the necessary software.43 
But when Sinclair finally ventured back into corpus work, it was 
to take on an ambitious project that dealt with the issue of meaning 
 
Sinclair (14 June 1933 – 13 March 2007), in THE PHRASEOLOGICAL VIEW OF LANGUAGE: A 
TRIBUTE TO JOHN SINCLAIR 1 (Thomas Herbst et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter A Tribute to John 
McHardy Sinclair]. 
 36. J. McH. Sinclair, Beginning the Study of Lexis, in IN MEMORY OF J.R. FIRTH 410 (C. 
E. Bazell et al. eds., 1966) [hereinafter Beginning the Study of Lexis]; Lexis as a Linguistic Level, 
supra note 30, at 148. 
 37. Beginning the Study of Lexis, supra note 36, at 410. 
 38. See J. MCH. SINCLAIR ET AL., ENGLISH LEXICAL STUDIES: REPORT TO THE OFFICE 
FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION (1970) [hereinafter OSTI REPORT], reprinted 
in JOHN SINCLAIR ET AL., ENGLISH COLLOCATION STUDIES: THE OSTI REPORT 2 (Ramesh 
Krishnamurthy ed., 2004) [hereinafter ENGLISH COLLOCATION STUDIES]. 
 39. OSTI REPORT, supra note 38, at 3; see generally A Tribute to John McHardy Sinclair, 
supra note 35, at 7. 
 40. OSTI REPORT, supra note 38, at 3. 
 41. Id. at 5, 18–23. 
 42. Wolfgang Teubert, Interview with John Sinclair, in ENGLISH COLLOCATION 
STUDIES, supra note 38, xvii, xix–xx. 
 43. Id. 
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head on: leading the creation of the world’s first dictionary based on 
a computerized corpus.44 This project literally created the field of cor-
pus lexicography, and its impact on lexicography more generally has 
been described as revolutionary.45 
The project was a collaboration between Birmingham University 
(where Sinclair was based) and the British publisher Collins.46 Both 
the project and the dictionary it produced are referred to by the name 
of the corpus: “Cobuild,” which stood for “Collins Birmingham Uni-
versity International Language Database.” The dictionary itself was 
called the Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, and it was 
published in 1987.47 It is now in its eighth edition, under the name 
Collins Cobuild Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, although Sinclair and 
his team have not been involved since the second edition.48 
 
 44. COLLINS COBUILD ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY (John Sinclair et al. eds., 1st 
ed. 1987) [hereinafter COBUILD1]. On Cobuild’s status as the first dictionary to be based on 
corpus data, see, for example, Rosamund Moon, Explaining Meaning in Learners’ Dictionaries 
[hereinafter Explaining Meaning in Learners’ Dictionaries], in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY 123, 131 (Philip Durkin ed., 2016) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY]; John Sinclair, Introduction to COBUILD1, supra, at xv [hereinafter Introduc-
tion to COBUILD1]; A Tribute to John McHardy Sinclair, supra note 35, at 8. A few dictionaries 
had previously consulted corpus data for limited purposes, but without any significant change in 
lexicographic practices. See, e.g., SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY 279 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY]; Corpus Evidence and Electronic Lexicography, supra note 25, at 61; William 
Morris, The Making of a Dictionary—1969, 20 C.  COMPOSITION & COMM. 198, 201 (1969). 
 45. E.g., ENGLISH DICTIONARIES FOR FOREIGN LEARNERS, supra note 34, at 118; 
HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 131 (2002). 
 46. John Sinclair, Introduction to LOOKING UP: AN ACCOUNT OF THE COBUILD 
PROJECT IN LEXICAL COMPUTING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLLINS COBUILD 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE DICTIONARY at vii–viii (J M Sinclair, ed., 1987) [hereinafter LOOKING 
UP]. The book that I’ve just cited provides detailed description of the project, with chapters 
written by Sinclair and several of his colleagues. 
 47. COBUILD1, supra note 44; see LOOKING UP, supra note 46 (providing a detailed 
description of the project, with chapters written by Sinclair and his colleagues). For additional 
discussion, see, for example, THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH, supra note 8, at 177–84; 
ENGLISH DICTIONARIES FOR FOREIGN LEARNERS, supra note 34, at 123–25, 147–48, 152–54, 
158–60, 163–65, 170–71; Rosamund Moon, Sinclair, Lexicography, and the Cobuild Project: 
The Application of Theory, in WORDS, GRAMMAR, TEXT: REVISITING THE WORK OF JOHN 
SINCLAIR 1 (Rosamund Moon ed., 2009). 
 48. COLLINS COBUILD ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2014). 
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Cobuild was from the beginning a “learner’s dictionary,” meaning 
that it was intended for people learning English as a foreign lan-
guage.49 Now, some readers might be dismissive of the idea that a dic-
tionary for learners could represent a serious work of lexicography, 
thinking of it as a dumbed-down version of a “real” dictionary. But 
such a view would be mistaken. To begin with, Cobuild is intended 
for advanced learners, and that is reflected in the selection of words it 
includes; on a single page of the first edition, for example, we find 
consortium, conspiratorial, and consternation.50 More importantly, 
Cobuild and other advanced-learners’ dictionaries provide more infor-
mation in some respects than do dictionaries intended for native 
speakers. Dictionaries for advanced learners are typically more in-
formative about the grammatical patterns in which the defined words 
appear and about the words’ most frequent collocates.51 The reason is 
obvious: learners need to be given such information explicitly, while 
native speakers do not. There is, of course, a tradeoff. Learners’ dic-
tionaries focus more on words and word meanings that are relatively 
frequent: “[A] native-speaker dictionary will tell you less about more 
whereas a learners’ dictionary will tell you more about less.”52 
The difference between the two kinds of dictionaries is potentially 
significant in connection with the use of dictionaries in legal interpre-
tation. Because learners’ dictionaries provide more information about 
the kinds of contexts in which particular words typically appear, they 
are less susceptible than native-speaker dictionaries to the criticism 
that their definitions are acontextual. As I have said, the real problem 
with lack of context is that the dictionaries on which judges and law-
yers most often rely do little or nothing to map individual word senses 
to their preferred contexts. In contrast, learners’ dictionaries attempt 
 
 49. See, e.g., ENGLISH DICTIONARIES FOR FOREIGN LEARNERS, supra note 34, at 118–
21; John Sinclair (1933–2007), supra note 35, at 212–13; Introduction to COBUILD1, supra 
note 44, at xvi. 
 50. COBUILD1, supra note 44, at 301. 
 51. See, e.g., THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 300–
02; THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH, supra note 8, at 197–98; Reinhard Heuberger, Learners’ 
Dictionaries: History and Development; Current Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 44, at 35–38; Explaining Meaning in Learners’ Dictionaries, supra 
note 44, at 133–35. 
 52. THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH, supra note 8, at 197 (attributing quote to 
C. McGregor). 
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to provide such information. This suggests that lawyers and judges 
who use dictionaries as interpretive tools should start consulting learn-
ers’ dictionaries. 
B. The Significance of Being Corpus-Based 
For its first edition, Cobuild used two corpora that together in-
cluded about twenty million words.53 Although that is small by today’s 
standards,54 it was almost 150 times the size of the main corpus that 
had been used in Sinclair’s project in the late 1960s.55 As we will see, 
that increase in size made a big difference. But first, it is worth looking 
at the ways in which the use of corpora improved on prior lexico-
graphic practice. The difference was not a matter of simply automating 
what had previously been performed by hand. Rather, the use of  
corpora made possible major improvements in the data that lexicog-
raphers relied on and in the methods for analyzing that data. To un-
derstand the nature of those improvements, it is necessary to first  
understand what that data consists of. 
Simply stated, lexicographic data consists of information about 
how words are actually used. Although dictionaries for native speakers 
typically portray word meanings as abstractions that exist inde-
pendently of the actual use of the word, that is precisely the opposite 
of how usage relates to meaning. The meanings of the words used in 
a given linguistic community are matters of tacit convention, and lex-
icographers regard it as their job to accurately reflect those conven-
tions. As two leading lexicographers say in their recent textbook, “A 
reliable dictionary is one whose generalizations about word behavior 
approximate closely to the ways in which people normally use (and 
understand) language when engaging in real communicative acts 
(such as writing novels or business reports, reading newspapers, or 
having conversations).”56 
 
 53. See Antoinette Renouf, Corpus Development, in LOOKING UP, supra note 46, at 7, 
11–12. 
 54.  See, e.g., THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 58. 
 55.  See OSTI REPORT, supra note 38, at 18 (noting that the corpus used for the collo-
cation study contained 135,000 words). 
 56.  THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY , supra note 12, at 46–47. 
Controversy can arise (mainly outside the lexicographic community) as to how dictionaries treat 
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To achieve reliability by this standard, lexicographers demand ob-
jective evidence: namely, data that comes from “observing language 
in use.”57 And that requires “looking at what speakers and writers ac-
tually do when they communicate with listeners and readers.”58 Then, 
generalizing from “the mass of available language data,” lexicogra-
phers attempt “to make explicit the meaning distinctions which 
—in normal communication—humans deal with unconsciously  
and effortlessly.”59 
But what exactly is the nature of the evidence that lexicographers 
work with, and how do they assemble it? Before there were electronic 
corpora, and to some extent even now, lexicographers relied on exam-
ples of actual usage that had been compiled in “citation files”—collec-
tions of sentences excerpted from books, newspapers, magazines, and 
so on, each of which was selected to illustrate the use of a particular 
word.60 The quotations were gathered by hand, one at a time, with 
each one being recorded on its own slip or card.61 
Computerized corpora offer two advantages compared to relying 
on individually gathered citations. The first results from how the data 
was collected. The selection of individual citations is unavoidably ad 
hoc and subjective; citation readers are attracted to unusual words and 
 
certain usages that are widespread but nevertheless regarded by some as being wrong, such as 
the use of infer to mean imply. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 
228 n.3 (1994); HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S 
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 171–214 (1994) [hereinafter THE STORY OF 
WEBSTER’S THIRD]. However, when views about how language should be used are at odds with 
how language actually is used, they should play no role in legal interpretation. See Neal Goldfarb, 
Prescriptivist Statutory Interpretation? (Part 2 of Scalia and Garner on Statutory Interpretat-
ion), LAWNLINGUISTICS (July 6, 2012), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2012/07/06/prescrip-
tivist-statutory-interpretation-part-2-of-scalia-and-garner-on-statutory-interpretation/. But cf. 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 422 (2012) (urging caution in using Webster’s Third New International Dictionary “be-
cause of its frequent inclusion of doubtful, slipshod meanings without adequate usage notes”). 
 57. THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 47. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 311. 
 60. E.g., id. at 48–53; DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra 
note 44, at 189–207; THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 56, at 94–98. The practice 
goes back at least as far as Samuel Johnson. See HENRY HITCHINGS, DEFINING THE WORLD: 
THE EXTRAORDINARY STORY OF DR. JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY 78–84 (2005). 
 61. E.g., THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 50; DIC-
TIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 44, at 190; THE STORY OF 
WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 56, at 94–95. 
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unusual meanings, so the ordinary uses of ordinary words are un-
derrepresented.62 Citation files are therefore less likely to provide reli-
able evidence of the full range of normal usage.63 And they cannot 
provide evidence about the relative frequencies of the various senses 
of a word, because there is no way to quantify the universe of texts 
from which the citations were selected.64 A corpus, on the other hand, 
is made up of a variety of different types of texts (often including tran-
scripts of spontaneous speech) that are chosen in an effort to approx-
imate the range of conventional use.65 And because the total size of 
the corpus is known, computing frequencies is easy. 
The second advantage of corpora over citation files has to do with 
how the data is presented. In a traditional citation file, each citation is 
an independent mini-text, recorded on its own card or slip of paper.66 
That is not a format designed to facilitate the discovery of recurrent 
patterns of usage. In contrast, corpus data can be reviewed using a 
key-word-in-context (KWIC) display, which makes such patterns eas-
ier to spot. Such a display (often referred to as a concordance) is in 
effect a spreadsheet, each line of which presents one use of the key 
word, with the context that immediately precedes and follows it; the 
key word appears by itself in a column in the middle, flanked on either 
side by the columns that present the context, as shown in this example: 
  
 
 62. E.g., DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 44, at 104, 
192–93; THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 56, at 95. 
 63. See BO SVENSÉN, A HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
DICTIONARY-MAKING 44–45 (2009) [hereinafter A HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY]; The Dic-
tionary Is Not A Fortress, supra note 2, at 1915–16 (discussing the evidence on this point). 
 64. See, e.g., DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 44, at 
104; A HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 63, at 44. 
 65. See, e.g., THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 53–
78; Marc Kupietz, Constructing a Corpus, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEXICOGRAPHY, 
supra note 44, at 63–68. 
 66. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 61. 
3.GOLDFARB_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  3:58 PM 
1359 A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning . . .  
 1377 
 
. . .Mrs. Beck’s third grade students watch her carry a cardboard box into the classroom False 
‘s defenses have been weakened, the fighter will carry a heavier load on wing pylons False 
OK . All right, ready ? Mr-MOONEN: Poblano peppers  carry a little bit of heat , so you do n’t have to 
. . .David Souter tonight in New Hampshire. We will carry a live-stream of the event on our Web siteFalse 
I have met him . Sometimes the museum asks me to carry a message to him. He is muy pacifico . A gentleman 
. . .Frewer than we did in the trailer; Gordon-Levitt can carry a movie in a comic leading role . # Oct. 7 # 
. . . can mean substantial health benefits but can also carry a serious increased risk . (Voiceover) So how should 
in a single green olive without a toothpick. We each carry a serving plate and head into the large front room , 
eager to try the new technique there. # Most rocks carry a small amount of the element strontium (Sr ) . All 
every level of the organization. Planning has helped carry a young company over its first formidable hump  
boot with a standard liner , and shops typically don’t carry an extensive offering of custom-fit boots . So. . . 
this, of course , did nothing to help the administration carry out a coherent Middle Eastern policy. 39 # Kissinger 
Reviewing a concordance is obviously different than reading an 
independent text. While “[a]n individual text is designed to be read as 
a whole, linearly, from left to right,” concordances are “designed to 
be read as a series of fragments, vertically, from top to bottom.”67 It is 
easy to scan down the page (or monitor screen) and see patterns: re-
curring meanings, frequent collocates of the key word, grammatical 
constructions in which the key word appears, and so on. For example, 
in the short concordance excerpt above, the pattern that should be 
readily apparent is the frequent occurrence of nonliteral uses of carry. 
The format makes it easy to identify the different types of such uses. 
As Sinclair said, “The language looks rather different when you look 
at a lot of it at once.”68 
Due to the combined effect of better data and a better way to 
review it, the Cobuild lexicographers found the corpus data to be a 
revelation. In an account of the project, one of them wrote, “English 
had been thoroughly described many times, yet the team felt that they 
were discovering it like a new-found territory, and mapping its features 
and composition as if for the first time from a scientific perspective.”69 
The project’s managing editor is similarly enthusiastic about what he 
 
 67. See, e.g., Michael Stubbs, The Search for Units of Meaning: Sinclair on Empirical Se-
mantics, 30 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 115, 117 (2009). 
 68. CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 100. 
 69. Rosamund Moon, The Cobuild Project, in 2 THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LEXICOGRAPHY 436, 442 (A. P. Cowie ed., 2009) [hereinafter The Cobuild Project]. 
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describes as the “overwhelming” impact of corpora: “At last lexicog-
raphers have sufficient evidence to make the generalizations that they 
need to make with reasonable confidence. We can now see that pre-
corpus lexicography was little more than a series of stabs in the dark.”70 
The view that corpora provide better data than citation files is 
widely shared.71 In Dictionaries: The Art and Craft of Lexicography, 
Sidney Landau said that “the electronic corpus has replaced the cita-
tion file as the essential research tool in general lexicography,”72 and 
that “other things being equal, any new dictionary not based on a 
linguistic corpus is bound to be inferior to one that is.”73 Similarly, 
Howard Jackson says in Lexicography: An Introduction, “It is no ex-
aggeration to say that computer corpora have revolutionized the lexi-
cographic process, in terms both of the quality of lexical data that can 
be obtained and of the reliability of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from that data.”74 
C. Insights from Cobuild 
Having seen what corpora can offer by way of improvements in 
lexicographic tools, let’s look at the insights regarding word meaning 
that those tools helped to deliver. I will divide those results into two 
broad categories, which I will label Findings and Conclusions. The first 
category will deal with the evidence of usage patterns that the corpora 
revealed, and will draw some generalizations from that evidence. The 
second will shift the emphasis more toward the theoretical, by consid-
ering what the evidence and generalizations can tell us about how 
meaning arises from the words that make up a text. 
1. Findings about word meanings 
I will begin this discussion by approaching the specifics of word 
meaning from the side, as it were, by talking about what the Cobuild 
 
 70. Patrick Hanks, The Impact of Corpora on Dictionaries, in CONTEMPORARY COR-
PUS  LINGUISTICS 214, 230 (Paul Baker ed., 2009) [hereinafter The Impact of Corpora on Dic-
tionaries]. 
 71. See, e.g., THE LEXICOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH, supra note 8, at 368–69. 
 72. DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 44, at 193. 
 73. Id. at 77. 
 74. HOWARD JACKSON, LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 169 (2002) (citat-
ion  omitted). 
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data revealed about the relative frequencies of the various senses of 
polysemous words. I do that partly because talking about frequency 
will provide a good entry point into the issue of word mean-
ing,  and  partly because frequency is independently relevant to le- 
gal interpretation 
Courts sometimes seem to equate “ordinary meaning” with “most 
common meaning.”75 But such an appeal to overall frequency will of-
ten be misguided; as we will see, the meaning of a particular usage of 
a word is more likely to be determined by the immediate linguistic 
context in which it appears than by which sense of the word is the 
most frequent in general.76 So the relative frequency of different senses 
will typically be relevant only if the inquiry focuses on the specific us-
age that is at issue.77 
But even putting all of that aside, if courts are going to consider 
the relative frequencies of different senses, they will need to find out 
which sense is the most common one. And the corpus data suggests 
that our intuitions about frequency are often unreliable—as are fre-
quency judgments in dictionaries that are not corpus-based.78 
 
 75. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Comm’r, 737 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 1984); Mu-Hun Kim v. Ariz. 
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs’, No. 1 CA-CV 10-0374, 2011 WL 797466, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
Mar. 8, 2011); Wallbeoff v. Wallbeoff, No. FA064004613S, 2009 WL 4282286, at *3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 2009); People v. Ellison, No. 313422, 2014 WL 806115, at *2 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Feb. 27, 2014). 
 76. See infra notes 84–113 and accompanying text. 
 77. For an example of such an inquiry, see my examination of Muscarello v. United States 
in Part VI, below, and the prior discussion of the same case by Stephen Mouritsen, The Diction-
ary is Not a Fortress, supra note 2, at 1958–70. See also, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 
UT 38, ¶ 96, 266 P.3d 702, 726 (Utah 2011) (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“I cannot imagine how we can have a meaningful conversation about the ‘ordi-
nary’ meaning of a statutory term without asking how a given term is most commonly used in a 
given context.”); Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 6, at 9 (“[E]ven a common sense of a 
term might not be the most frequent use of it in a certain context.”). 
 78. John Sinclair, Introdiction to LOOKING UP, supra note 46, at vii; Patrick Hanks, Evi-
dence and Intuition in Lexicography, in MEANING AND LEXICOGRAPHY 31, 35 (Jerzy To-
maszczyk & Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk eds., 1990); The Dictionary Is Not A Fortress, 
supra note 2, at 1935–36. Of the pre- corpus dictionaries in which the ordering of senses was 
based at least in part on the editors’ views about the senses’ relative frequencies, the most im-
portant was probably the Random House Dictionary. See A Guide to the Dictionary, in THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE xv, xix (unabridged ed. 1967). 
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Contrary to what one might expect, a word’s most frequently ap-
pearing sense is in many cases not its most literal or concrete sense.79 
As one of the Cobuild lexicographers wrote later, “metaphorical 
meanings might be much more frequent than literal ones, as with 
reflect/reflection and torrent.”80 For many other words, “the most 
frequent uses were phrasal or delexicalized.”81 Phrasal uses include 
fixed expressions such as of course, instances of which “vastly 
outnumbered instances of course used in reference to education, 
courses of action, or routes.”82 Delexicalized uses include verb phrases 
in which the verb itself has little meaning, and most of the meaning is 
provided by the direct object, as in give a speech, have a conversation, 
and take a guess. 
Looking at the delexicalized uses of verbs provides a gateway to 
new ways of thinking about word meaning—especially with respect to 
words that are polysemous. When one thinks about a polysemous 
word in isolation, what most often comes to mind first is not a delex-
icalized sense like one of those discussed above, but a sense that most 
people would describe as the word’s “literal,” “basic,” or “primary” 
meaning.83 For give, that would be ‘transfer’; for have, it would be 
‘possess’; and for take it would probably be something like ‘acquire 
possession by grasping.’ Perhaps the most important difference be-
tween the two kinds of meanings is that the literal/basic/primary 
sense has a stable and relatively definable meaning independent of a 
particular context, while the delexicalized sense does not. Consider 
the following expressions and try to describe the meaning that is con-
tributed to each one by the verb: 
give meaning [to something], give reason to believe [something], give ef-
fect to [something], give priority to [something], give thought to 
[something], give [somebody] a break, give advice 
have a conversation, have an effect/influence, have a party, have a meeting, 
have a seat, have sex, have an experience, have a chance 
 
 79. CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 112–13; LOOKING UP, 
supra note 46, at vii; John Sinclair, The Dictionary of the Future,  36 LIBR. REV. 268, 272–73 
(1987) [hereinafter The Dictionary of the Future); see The Cobuild Project, supra note 69, 
at 448– 50. 
 80. The Cobuild Project, supra note 69, at 443. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 113. 
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take a walk, take a nap, take a swim, take a shot, take a swing, take the 
trouble to [do something], take care of [something], take a chance, 
take a vacation, take charge, take the blame 
I suspect that you will find this task to be challenging. In some 
cases, the verb seems to serve no purpose other than enabling the 
event denoted by the phrase to be designated by a noun rather than a 
verb (give thought, have a conversation, take a walk). In other cases, 
the verb seems to have more semantic content, but only in an abstract 
and generalized sense. For example, one can view the events denoted 
by give advice and take the blame as involving metaphorical acts of giv-
ing and taking. But the same can’t be said for some of the other ex-
amples. In what way does the phrase have a meeting evoke the element 
of possession that is integral to the literal meaning of have? In what 
way does give thought to [something] or take a walk evoke even meta-
phorical acts of giving or taking? 
The fact is that these phrases are not fully compositional—their 
meanings are not fully determined by what the words mean and how 
they are syntactically combined. Phrases like the ones above therefore 
pose a problem for the Dictionary Paradigm. That is a topic that I will 
return to, but not until after discussing a number of issues revealed by 
the corpus data that pose similar problems. 
One of those issues relates to “high-frequency general nouns” 
such as fact, matter, time, and way. The corpus data showed that these 
were most often used in multiword expressions whose meanings were, 
like those of the verb phrases discussed above, not fully composi-
tional.84 (And I would add that some of the expressions exhibit a de-
gree of delexicalization.) As reflected in the entries in Cobuild (and as 
can be seen in COCA), these include the following: 
the fact that, in fact, in point of fact, as a matter of fact, the fact is, is that a 
fact, the fact remains 
no matter, no matter who/what/when/where/why, what’s the matter, a 
matter of course/time/opinion, for that matter 
at times [=sometimes], at all times, at any time, at the same time [=simul-
taneously], at the same time [≈various discourse functions], (just) in 
time, out of time [=no time left], out of time [=late (in litigation con-
text)], behind/ahead of time, for the time being, make time, take 
time, pass the time, waste time 
 
 84. The Cobuild Project, supra note 69, at 444. 
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by the way, by way of, all/part of/some of/most of the way, come a long 
way [literally and/or figuratively], in the way, out of the way [=not 
obstructing], out of the way [=away from crowds and hard to get to], 
go one’s own way, way out there, no way! [often followed by dude], 
way [as response to preceding item] (Alright, the last two didn’t really 
come from Cobuild.) 
Of these words, it seems to me that time displays the smallest de-
gree of delexicalization, so that the various expressions that it appears 
in preserve a good deal of the meaning inherent in the noun. But what 
is interesting is that different aspects of that meaning—different ways 
of thinking about time—are highlighted in different expressions: 
time as a point in the flow of time: at the same time (as), (at) a different 
time, at this time, at that time 
time as an occasion or instance of an event: the first/second/. . . time, that 
time, this time, last time, next time, every time, many times, another 
time [=again], time after time, 
time as duration: a long time, a short time, a day’s time, a period of time, 
the allotted time, 
time in relation to need, obligation, opportunity, etc.: in time, on time, 
ahead of time, out of time, enough time, insufficient time, now is the 
time, the wrong time, it’s time to leave 
time as a resource: my/your/her. . . time, enough time, insufficient time, 
need more time, [action, process, etc.] takes time, take your time, out 
of time, keep track of your time 
time as an experience: have a good/bad time, a difficult time, give someone 
a hard time, having the time of my life 
time as (pre)history: the time of the dinosaurs, in colonial times, in Isaac 
Newton’s time, before my time, the best/worst of times 
What we’re seeing here is that time has a range of possible meanings 
and that in a given use of the word, the intended meaning is activated 
by the grammatical and collocational context in which the word  
is embedded. 
The last phenomenon that I will discuss here is that of transitive 
verbs. We have already looked at delexicalized uses of transitive verbs, 
but I will focus now on uses in which the verb is not delexicalized (or 
at least not very much). And what we will see is that the meaning of 
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the verb in context is in many cases determined by the word that func-
tions as the verb’s direct object:85 
throw a football, throw a football game, throw a party, throw a fit, throw 
a  switch 
drop a dish, drop a course, drop a hint, drop a claim (from a lawsuit) 
observe a religious holiday, observe somebody’s activities 
break a window, break a date, break a law 
sell a product, sell an idea 
smoke a cigarette, smoke a salmon 
file a piece of metal, file a lawsuit 
grill a steak, grill a witness 
examine a witness, examine a patent, examine a patient 
exhibit symptoms, exhibit paintings 
run a race, run a machine, run a risk, run an advertisement, run an errand 
pull a rope, pull rank, pull a prank, pull a gun, pull a switch 
In those examples, the differences in meaning for each verb are fairly 
substantial. But in other instances, the difference is subtler: 
cut the bread, cut the grass, cut somebody’s hair [different types of cutting] 
write a novel, write your name [different levels of creativity & composi-
tion] 
bake a potato [=cook a potato by baking], bake a cake [=create a cake by 
baking cake batter] 
In still other cases, a particular meaning is activated by a more complex 
construction, such as V+NP+PP (Verb plus Noun Phrase plus Prepo-
sitional Phrase): 
smoke somebody out of hiding 
sell somebody out, sell a stock short 
throw something out, throw somebody out of somewhere 
run somebody out of town, run something into the ground 
2. Conclusions from the findings 
Based on the kind of data I have been discussing, the Cobuild 
team concluded that distinctions among the various possible meanings 
of a given word depended on context in some very specific ways. Spe-
cific meanings were associated with textual patterns that could be ob-
 
 85. This phenomenon was known before Cobuild. See ALEC MARANTZ, ON THE NATURE 
OF GRAMMATICAL RELATIONS 25 (1984); Uriel Weinreich, Webster’s Third: A Critique of Its 
Semantics, 30 INT’L J. AM. LINGUISTICS 405, 405–06 (1964). 
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jectively identified and described, such as collocations between differ-
ent words and collocations between specific words on the one hand 
and particular grammatical categories and patterns on the other.86 On 
a practical level, this enabled the lexicographers to use that patterning 
as a guide in deciding how to draw the lines dividing the different 
senses of a word.87 It also heavily influenced the way in which the en-
tries in the dictionary were written. 
The emphasis in writing the entries was very much on showing the 
kinds of context in which each meaning typically occurred, with con-
text referring to both lexical collocations and grammatical structures.88 
One way this was done was through the examples that were given of 
the word in use, which were much more extensive than in dictionaries 
for native speakers, and which were almost entirely taken from the 
corpus.89 Sinclair insisted that it was vital to draw examples from real 
text: “Those dictionaries that stand as milestones in our cultural his-
tory use real citations: Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 and the Ox-
ford English Dictionary begun by Murray in 1878. They understood 
that the dictionary is really just a commentary on the examples; the 
examples have a justification of their own.”90 Context was also empha-
sized through the novel style in which Cobuild’s explanations were 
written.91 (“Explanations” was the word used by the Cobuild team in 
place of “definitions,” based on their view that it better described what 
 
 86. See, e.g., The Cobuild Project, supra note 69, at 443–44; The Analysis of Meaning, 
supra note 27, at 90–94; COBUILD1, supra note 44, at xvii. 
 87. The Analysis of Meaning, supra note 27, at 89–94. 
 88. See, e.g., JOHN SINCLAIR, Words About Words, in CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, 
COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 123–37; Patrick Hanks, Definitions and Explanations, in 
LOOKING UP, supra note 46, at 116–36 [hereinafter Definitions and Explanations]. 
 89. E.g., Gwyneth Fox, The Case for Examples, in LOOKING UP, supra note 46, at 137–
49; COBUILD1, supra note 44, at xv–xvi. 
 90. The Dictionary of the Future, supra note 79, at 269. 
 91. The style of the explanations and its rationale are described in CORPUS, CONCOR-
DANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 123‒37; Definitions and Explanations, supra note 88, 
at 116–36; and The Dictionary of the Future, supra note 79, at 270–71. For an evaluation of the 
style that offers both praise and criticism, see Michael Rundell, More than One Way to Skin a 
Cat: Why Full-Sentence Definitions Have Not Been Universally Adopted, in PROCEEDINGS XII 
EURALEX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 323 (Elisa Corino et al. eds., 2006), reprinted in PRAC-
TICAL LEXICOGRAPHY: A READER, supra note 16, at 197‒210. 
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the entries actually did.92) As Sinclair explained in his introduction to 
the first edition, “The word being explained is normally mentioned in 
the explanation in such a way that you can see how it is typically used 
in English. In many cases, the explanation provides an illustration of 
the word in its typical grammatical context.”93 Thus, the first sense for 
conceal was given as follows: “If you conceal something, you cover it 
or hide it carefully, so that it cannot be seen.”94 The theory behind this 
style of wording is explained in Sinclair’s introduction, which simulta-
neously indicates the kind of linguistic data that was deemed relevant 
in crafting the explanation: “[The wording] suggests that the verb in 
this sense is typically used with a human subject and a wide range 
of  direct objects, which are typically inanimate or abstract rather 
than  human.”95 
Underlying these practical aspects of the Cobuild dictionary was 
an explicit theory of word meaning. And that theory, which is set forth 
in several of Sinclair’s writings, largely repudiates some unstated as-
sumptions that underlie the Dictionary Paradigm.96 
To begin with, Sinclair almost entirely rejected the idea that indi-
vidual words constitute the primary units of meaning. In a paper that 
appeared shortly before the first edition of Cobuild was published, he 
said, “Most everyday words do not have an independent meaning, or 
meanings, but are components of a rich repertoire of multi-word pat-
terns that make up text.”97 In the introduction to Cobuild’s first  
edition, he said that the meanings of particular words are “[o]ver-
whelmingly . . . bound up with a particular usage—a syntactic pattern, 
 
 92. Definitions and Explanations, supra note 91, at 116–36; The Cobuild Project, supra 
note 69, at 448–50; The Dictionary of the Future, supra note 79, at 270–71. 
 93. Introduction to COBUILD1, supra note 44, at xvi. 
 94. COBUILD1, supra note 44, at 287 (boldface in original). 
 95. Introduction to COBUILD1, supra note 44, at xvi. 
 96. E.g., John Sinclair, The Phrase, the Whole Phrase, and Nothing but the Phrase, in 
PHRASEOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 407 (Sylviane Granger & Fanny Meunier 
eds., 2008); John Sinclair, The Lexical Item, in CONTRASTIVE LEXICAL SEMANTICS 1 (Edda 
Weigand ed., 1998), reprinted in TRUST THE TEXT: LANGUAGE, CORPUS AND DISCOURSE 131–
48  (John Sinclair & Ronald Carter eds., 2004); John Sinclair, The Search for Units of Meaning, 
9 TEXTUS 75 (1996) [hereinafter The Search for Units of Meaning], reprinted in TRUST THE 
TEXT, supra, at 24‒48. 
 97. John McH. Sinclair, First Throw Away Your Evidence, in THE ENGLISH REFERENCE 
GRAMMAR: LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS, WRITERS AND READERS 56, 64 (Gerhard Leitner ed., 
1986), reprinted in CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 108. 
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perhaps, or a close association of words or a grouping of words into a 
set phrase.” As a result, Sinclair continued, “It is not really possible to 
talk about the meaning of [a] word in isolation—it only has a partic-
ular meaning when it is in a particular environment.”98 
In another paper from the same year, Sinclair set out what was 
perhaps the most complete statement of his views about word mean-
ing.99 He argued that “in order to explain the way in which meaning 
arises from language text, we have to advance two different principles 
of interpretation.”100 The first one he called “the open-choice princi-
ple,” under which words are seen as having the freedom to appear 
anywhere in a text, subject only to the constraints of syntax.101 What 
is important for present purposes is that this principle is generally con-
sistent with the Dictionary Paradigm in treating individual words as 
basic units of meaning. The second principle was what Sinclair called 
“the idiom principle.”102 Under the idiom principle, “a language user 
has available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed 
phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear 
to be analyzable into segments.”103 In Sinclair’s view, the idiom prin-
ciple provided the default interpretive principle for “normal texts,” 
but interpretation will switch into the open-choice mode as needed.104 
However, “[s]ome texts may be composed in a tradition which makes 
greater than normal use of the open-choice principle.”105 (One genre 
he described as possibly falling into this category was “legal state-
ments”;106 he was apparently unaware of how much formulaic lan-
guage is found in legal documents.) 
 
 98. COBUILD1, supra note 44, at xvii. 
 99. John Sinclair, Collocation: A Progress Report, in 2 LANGUAGE TOPICS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF MICHAEL HALLIDAY 319 (Ross Steele & Terry Threadgold eds., 1987), reprinted 
in CORPUS, CONCORDANCE, COLLOCATION, supra note 26, at 109–21 [herein- 
after Collocation]. 
 100. Collocation, supra note 99, at 109. 
 101. Id. at 109–10. 
 102. Id. at 110–15. 
 103. Id. at 110 (British spelling changed to American spelling). 
 104. Id. at 114. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. The other was poetry. Id. 
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Although Sinclair’s use of the terms open-choice principle and id-
iom principle might seem to suggest a binary distinction, they are bet-
ter viewed as identifying the opposite ends of a continuum. Sinclair 
himself said that “the preponderance of usage lies between the two.”107 
And the fact that he was talking about a spectrum rather than a di-
chotomy is reflected in another pair of terms that he coined: termino-
logical tendency and phraseological tendency (corresponding to the 
open-choice principle and the idiom principle, respectively).108 In any 
event, the idea that the basic unit of meaning is not necessarily the 
individual word is broadly applicable, especially with the common 
words that make up the core vocabulary of English. 
Along with substantially rejecting the view that words are the pri-
mary units of meaning, Sinclair rejected the idea that vocabulary and 
syntax are independent of one another. He argued instead that 
“[t]here [is] in practice no clear distinction between grammar and 
lexis” (lexis being the word corpus linguists use for vocabulary).109 Sin-
clair described the corpus data as showing that grammar and lexis were 
intertwined in multiple ways. “In nearly every case,” he said, “a struc-
tural pattern seemed to be associated with a sense. Despite the broad 
range of material in the corpus, when the instances were sorted into 
‘senses’, a recurrent pattern emerged.”110 And in many cases, “includ-
ing most of the common meanings of the common words,” there  
existed an even closer relationship between “the sense and the phrase-
ology.”111 The relationship that he describes here is the same relation-
ship that supports the view that meaning often resides in units larger 
than the individual word, but with a focus on grammatical as well as 
lexical collocation: “[I]t was clear that in these central patterns of Eng-
lish the meaning was only created by choosing two or more words 
simultaneously and disposing them according to fairly precise rules of 
position.”112 Thus, the view that lexis and grammar are inseparable and 
the view that words are the basic units of meaning are merely opposite 
sides of the same coin. 
 
 107. The Search for Units of Meaning, supra note 96, at 29. 
 108. Id. 
 109. JOHN SINCLAIR, Grammar in the Dictionary, in LOOKING UP, supra note 46, at 110. 
 110. Id. at 109. 
 111. Id. at 110. 
 112. Id. (emphasis added). 
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V. DO WORD MEANINGS EXIST? 
A. Doubters: Hanks, Atkins, and Kilgarriff 
The heading “Do Word Meanings Exist” is taken from the title of 
an article (and later a book chapter) by Patrick Hanks,113 who was the 
managing editor of Cobuild’s first edition and was later Chief Editor 
of Current English Dictionaries at Oxford University Press, where he 
supervised the first edition of what was then titled the New Oxford 
Dictionary of English.114 While it may seem odd for a professional lex-
icographer to ask whether word meanings exist, Hanks is not the only 
member of the profession to question their existence. Sue Atkins, who 
played “a formative role” in the Cobuild project’s design115 and who 
more recently co-authored the “Oxford Guide to Practical Lexicogra-
phy,” is quoted by Hanks as having said, “I don’t believe in word 
meanings.”116 And to the list of nonbelievers one can add Adam Kil-
garriff, a computational linguist whose doctoral dissertation investi-
gated the nature of dictionary word senses, and who (before his death 
in 2015 at age fifty-five) did important work at the intersection of 
lexicography and computer science.117 Hanks and Atkins are among 
 
 113. LEXICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 65–84; Patrick Hanks, Do Word Meanings Ex-
ist?, 34 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 205 (2000), reprinted in PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY: A 
READER, supra note 16, at 125‒34 [hereinafter Do Word Meanings Exist?]. 
 114. For Hanks’s background and publications, see his website, PATRICK HANKS, 
LEXICOGRAPHER, www.patrickhanks.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). The New Oxford Dic-
tionary of English (and its later editions, which dropped the “New” from the title) deals with 
modern-day British English, and should not be confused with the Oxford English Dictionary, 
which is a historical dictionary that traces the meanings of words back to their first recorded use 
in English, whenever that was. An “Americanized” version of the Oxford Dictionary of English 
has been published as the New Oxford American Dictionary. See Corpus Evidence and Electronic 
Lexicography, supra note 25, at 62. 
 115. John Sinclair, Foreword to COBUILD1, supra note 44, at v. For Atkins’s background 
and publications, see Sue Atkins, LEXICOM, https://sites.google.com/a/lexmasterclass 
.com/www2/people_sa (last visited Jan. 29, 2018); Sue Atkins: Publications, LEXICOM, https:  
//sites.google.com/a/lexmasterclass.com/www2/people_sa_pub (last vistited Jan. 29,  2018). 
 116. Do Word Meanings Exist?, supra note 113, at 125. Or maybe what she said was “I 
don’t believe in word senses” See LEXICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at 65; “I Don’t Believe in 
Word Senses,” supra note 16. Or maybe both, at different times. 
 117. For information on Kilgarriff ’s background, see Curriculum Vitae: Adam Kilgarriff, 
ADAM KILGARRIFF, https://www.kilgarriff.co.uk/cv.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). For a bib-
liographic essay describing his work, see Adam Kilgarriff: Structured Bibliography, SKETCH 
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the leading figures of modern lexicography, as was Kilgarriff before his 
untimely death. 
Kilgarriff ’s inclusion among the word-meaning skeptics highlights 
the fact that the skepticism results not only from the use of corpora in 
lexicography but also from work in the field of natural language pro-
cessing (NLP). NLP is an interdisciplinary field focusing on the pro-
cessing of human language by computers.118 One of the topics it deals 
with is word-sense disambiguation (WSD)—“the task of examining 
word tokens in context and determining which sense of each word is 
being used.”119 This has required attention to be devoted to the nature 
of word meaning and lexical ambiguity. Whereas people can under-
stand language effortlessly, without any conscious knowledge of se-
mantics, the same is not true of computers. If we want a computer to 
“understand” natural language, the computer needs to be given an 
explicit model of meaning and ambiguity.120 And developing such 
models requires an understanding of those phenomena as they operate 
in real life. Thus, lexicography has obvious relevance for work in WSD, 
and vice versa.121 
B. Reasons for Doubt 
Having set the stage, let’s return to the question that is asked in 
this section’s title: do word meanings exist? If by “word meanings” 
you are talking about the kinds of word senses that are found in tradi-
tional dictionaries, Hanks, Atkins, and Kilgarriff, would say no. 
 
ENGINE, https://www.sketchengine.co.uk/adam-kilgarriff-structured-bibliography/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2018). 
 118. See generally, e.g., DANIEL JURAFSKY & JAMES H. MARTIN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING: AN INTRODUCTION TO NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING, COMPUTATIONAL 
LINGUISTICS, AND SPEECH RECOGNITION (2d ed. 2009). 
 119. Id. at 637. 
 120. YORICK A. WILKS ET AL., ELECTRIC WORDS: DICTIONARIES, COMPUTERS, AND 
MEANINGS 69 (1996). 
 121. See, e.g., Adam Kilgarriff, Dictionary Word Sense Distinctions: An Enquiry Into Their 
Nature, 26 COMPUTERS & HUMAN. 365 (1992) [hereinafter Dictionary Word Sense Distinc-
tions); “I Don’t Believe in Word Senses,” supra note 16, at 142–51; Adam Kilgarriff, Word Senses, 
in WORD SENSE DISAMBIGUATION: ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS 29 (Eneko Agirre & 
Philip Edmonds eds., 2007) [hereinafter Word Senses]; Adam Kilgarriff, Word Senses Are Not 
Bona Fide Objects: Implications for Cognitive Science, Formal Semantics, NLP, in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE FIFTH CONFERENCE ON THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROCESSING 193 (1996). 
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Hanks, Atkins, and Kilgarriff see that conception of word meaning as 
being at odds with the evidence. 
For example, Atkins has described dictionary definitions of the 
kind we are familiar with as “trying to do what the language simply 
will not allow.”122 She argues that word meaning “cannot be sliced up 
into distinct bundles, labelled (however carefully) and packaged into 
a dictionary entry which will tell the truth, the whole truth and noth-
ing but the truth about that word.”123 And similarly: “Faced now with 
the overwhelming richness and subtlety of the language in a comput-
erized corpus, I no longer believe that it is possible to give a faithful, 
far less a true, account of the ‘meaning’ of a word within the con-
straints of the traditional entry structure.”124 
At this point, a caveat is in order. I take Atkins to be referring 
mainly to high-frequency words, which tend to be the most polyse-
mous, and not necessarily to all words. Standard dictionary definitions 
may be adequate for relatively unusual words (particularly technical 
words), which are less likely to have meanings that are dependent on 
context. Such words fall on the open-choice end of Sinclair’s distinc-
tion between the open-choice principle and the idiom principle. 
However, as to words whose meanings are sensitive to context, it 
seems obvious in hindsight that the slice-and-dice approach to mean-
ing won’t work. As to such words, there is a mismatch between, on 
the one hand, the presentation in dictionaries of word meaning as ab-
stractions attributed entirely to the word being defined and, on the 
other hand, the way that meaning is actually made in texts or dis-
course. As we have seen, meaning often arises from multiword con-
structions, with the relevant sense of the word at issue being activated 
by its linguistic surroundings. To the extent that meaning is spread 
across multiple words, one should not expect good results from an 
approach to meaning that focuses on individual words. 
 
 122. B.T.S. Atkins, Building a Lexicon: The Contribution of Lexicography, 4 INT’L J. LEXI-
COGRAPHY 167, 180 (1991) [hereinafter Building a Lexicon]. 
 123. Id. 
 124. B.T.S. ATKINS, Theoretical Lexicography and Its Relation to Dictionary-Making, 14 
DICTIONARIES: J. DICTIONARY SOC’Y NORTH AM., 4, 20 (1993). 
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1. Sense-division differences among dictionaries 
One symptom of the problem with word senses is that dictionaries 
differ in how they identify and carve up the different senses of a poly-
semous word. Atkins (working in some cases with prominent linguists) 
has compared how different dictionaries have treated various words, 
and has found that mismatches are not uncommon.125 One dictionary 
may include a sense that another one does not; where one dictionary 
gives two or three senses, another may lump them together into a sin-
gle sense that is broader but less specific; and the dividing lines be-
tween senses may be drawn in different places. 
I will illustrate this phenomenon with one example, taken from a 
paper that Atkins wrote with Charles Fillmore (one of the most im-
portant linguists of the past fifty years). The paper constituted an ex-
haustive study of the semantics of risk, as both a verb and a noun, and 
it found extensive disagreement as to sense distinctions among the 
dictionaries they studied.126 
The study began by examining how the use of risk as a verb was 
treated in three dictionaries. From that examination, Fillmore and At-
kins concluded that the dictionaries “diverge[d] fundamentally in the 
selection of facts to present.”127 The three dictionaries’ definitions, 
when combined, provided three senses:128 
[1] to expose to danger or loss; hazard: to risk one’s life. 
[2] to do something in spite of the possibility of (unfortunate conse-
quences): to risk falling; to risk a fall. 
[3] to incur the chance of unfortunate consequences by (doing some-
thing): to risk climbing the cliff. 
The differences between these senses concerned the semantic role 
played by the entity that is denoted by the verb’s direct object. In 
 
 125. See B.T.S. Atkins, Analyzing the Verbs of Seeing: A Frame Semantics Approach to Cor-
pus Lexicography, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BERKELEY 
LINGUISTICS SOCIETY: GENERAL SESSION DEDICATED TO THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CHARLES 
J. FILLMORE 42 (1994); Building a Lexicon, supra note 122; Charles J. Fillmore & B.T.S. Atkins, 
Starting Where the Dictionaries Stop: The Challenge of Corpus Lexicography, in COMPUTATIONAL 
APPROACHES TO THE LEXICON 349 (B.T.S. Atkins & A. Zampolli eds., 1994) [hereinafter Start-
ing Where the Dictionaries Stop]; Beth Levin, Grace Song & B.T.S. Atkins, Making Sense of Cor-
pus Data: A Case Study of Verbs of Sound, 2 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 23, 29–30 (1997). 
 126. Starting Where the Dictionaries Stop, supra note 125, at 351–55. 
 127. Id. at 352. 
 128. Id. The three senses set out in the text are adapted from this source but are not di-
rect quotations. 
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sense 1, that direct object denotes the thing that is put in danger; in 
sense 2, it denotes the bad thing that might happen; and in sense 3, it 
denotes it denotes the conduct that creates the risk. 
All three of the dictionaries included sense 1. However, two in-
cluded sense 2 but not sense 3, while the third included sense 3 but 
not sense 2. When Fillmore and Atkins looked at more dictionaries, 
they found several that followed the 2-but-not-3 pattern, plus some 
that followed still different patterns. Two dictionaries included all 
three senses, and three included sense 1 plus a single sense that blurred 
together senses 2 and 3. 
For uses of risk as a noun, the situation was even worse. Consid-
ering all the dictionaries together, Fillmore and Atkins concluded that 
“lexicographers who had all the facts at their disposal might have dis-
tinguished at the most five dictionary senses.”129 And each of the ten 
dictionaries handled the word differently, with each one including and 
omitting different combinations of the five possible senses, and in 
some cases lumping two or three of the senses together. 
Disparities such as these are problematic for the Dictionary Para-
digm. Such differences should not exist if, as many lawyers and judges 
seem to believe, the word senses given in dictionaries are abstract en-
tities that have some kind of independent existence. That the differ-
ences between dictionaries exists is evidence that distinguishing be-
tween word senses often depends at least in part on the exercise of 
judgment and discretion by the lexicographer. That process is una-
voidably subjective; there are no objective standards for distinguishing 
between senses.130 In the Oxford Guide to Practical Lexicography, At-
kins and her coauthor say that there is “nothing ‘definitive’” about 
how lexicographers divide words into separate senses.131 They note 
that James Murray, editor-in-chief of the Oxford English Dictionary, 
said “that the best any lexicographer could hope for would be that 
 
 129. Id. at 354. 
 130. E.g.,  THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 56, at 81; The Impact of Corpora 
on Dictionaries, supra note 70, at 224; Johnson and Modern Leixcography, supra note 4, at 258; 
“I Don’t Believe in Word Senses,” supra note 16, at 143. 
 131. THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 275. 
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readers would feel, on scanning a multisense dictionary entry, that 
‘this is not an unreasonable way of exhibiting the facts.’”132 
2. Some further problems regarding sense division 
Moving beyond the mere fact that dictionaries differ in how they 
divide up word meaning, the divisions themselves can raise issues. 
Let’s consider the word bank (in its financial sense), which most dic-
tionaries divide into two subsenses: one for a bank as an institution, 
establishment, business, or organization (the INSTITUTION sense) and 
another for a bank as a building or other location where the institution 
carries on its banking business (the BUILDING sense). Of the diction-
aries I looked at, only the Merriam-Webster dictionaries (the Una-
bridged and the Collegiate) did not include the BUILDING sense. 
The fact that all the other dictionaries provided two senses creates 
the impression that each sense is separate from the other. But are they 
really? Merriam-Webster didn’t think both senses were necessary. So 
maybe the conception of a bank as a building can be inferred from the 
conception of a bank as an institution, with the inference being acti-
vated when the word is used in an appropriate context. But if so, that 
suggests that what are presented as separate senses are not necessarily 
independent of each other. And that in turn casts doubt on the idea 
that an ambiguous statutory term can be interpreted simply by choos-
ing between different dictionary senses (as the Supreme Court did in 
Muscarello133). On the other hand, if one assumes the BUILDING sense 
is independent of the ESTABLISHMENT sense, that would seemingly 
open the door to dividing up the latter sense further: BANK-AS-
EMPLOYER (the bank laid off 100 employees), BANK-AS-CORPORATION 
(the bank has a new board of directors), BANK-AS-INSURED (the bank is 
covered by a $50 million insurance policy), BANK-AS-SPORTS-TEAM (the 
bank made it to the finals of the summer softball tournament). 
If lexicographers had to choose one of these two approaches in 
defining bank, I suspect that most would lump everything into a single 
broad sense. But either way, the decision would be based on practical 
considerations, not on which approach was somehow considered a 
more accurate representation of reality. 
 
 132. Id. (crediting the Murray quotation to The Analysis of Meaning, supra note 27, 
at  86). 
 133. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 127–32 (1998). 
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Staying with the example of bank, we can see that a use of the 
word may simultaneously activate more than one sense. Consider  
the sentence, I have a meeting at the bank. This pretty clearly activates 
the BUILDING sense, but not necessarily only that sense. An utterance 
of the sentence would probably be understood to communicate not 
only that the speaker had a meeting that was to be held on the bank’s 
premises, but also that the meeting would be with representatives of 
the bank and would concern the bank’s business, thereby activating 
the INSTITUTION sense. So, the different dictionary senses of a word 
are not always mutually exclusive.134 
A related issue concerns the fact that different senses of a word are 
not always divided by clear lines; sometimes they blend into one an-
other. Penelope Stock, who was one of the Cobuild lexicographers, 
discussed this problem in a paper that was published while the diction-
ary was being compiled; she spoke of a semantic “blurring” that oc-
curs “where a word seems either to operate on a cline between two or 
more meanings, or to bring in its train various extra nuances so that 
any individual utterance might suggest one strong aspect of a meaning 
but is, as it were, strengthened or supported by various other possible 
close meanings.”135 To illustrate this problem, Stock pointed to the 
word culture and provided a number of corpus examples, from which 
the following list is drawn.136 
There does seem evidence [sic] that Eastern cultures have more right 
brain  emphasis. 
the big colloquium on African culture and African civilization that’s to be held 
the great cultures of Japan and China 
Infanticide was practised by many early cultures 
desire to live as a nation that has its own culture and individuality 
a multicultural society where cultures can live side by side 
to give value and literate dress to an oral culture we have forgotten how 
to  appreciate. 
the Ministry of Culture 
by removing all traces of black ethics and culture. 
the culture of machismo 
Man dresses the part his culture tells him he is called upon to play. 
 
 134. See Dictionary Word Sense Distinctions, supra note 121, at 376–77. 
 135. Penelope F. Stock, Polysemy, in LEXETER ‘83 PROCEEDINGS: PAPERS FROM THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LEXICOGRAPHY AT EXETER 131, 137 (R.R.K. Hartmann ed., 
1983), reprinted in PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY: A READER, supra note 16, at 158. 
 136. Id. at 158–59. 
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nevertheless absorbed enough of Spanish political culture to build 
authoritarian principles 
Newspaper-reading, word-and-trade-conscious urban culture. 
I have shown how Caro’s work belongs to the culture of the early 1960’s 
culture shock 
 
has led to the development of a specific ‘pop’ culture 
the extension of the throw-away culture 
I have tried to arrange the order of these examples so that as you 
read down the list, culture displays a changing continuum of mean-
ings. In the first example, culture means X1, then in the second exam-
ple it means X2, which is similar to but slightly different from X1, and 
so on down the list, with each item differing slightly from the one 
before it. I have tried to order the examples so that in each line culture 
is used more narrowly than in the one before it (in an intuitive sense 
of “narrow” that I would be hard put to explain), so that the differ-
ence from one line to the next is small. And while there seems to be a 
clear difference in meaning between the first example and the last, it 
is difficult if not impossible to find the boundary between the two 
meanings, or to say whether there are intermediate meanings that 
might count as a third sense. There are quite possibly several ways of 
grouping the examples, none of which would be the right answer. 
C. “Meaning Is Something You Do.” 
After much discussion of what word meanings are not, it is time 
to talk about describing what they are. Or rather, how to de-
scribe  word meanings within the framework of (Sinclairian)  
corpus linguistics. 
I’m going to start with the statement by Kilgarriff that “meaning 
is something you do”137—a view endorsed by Hanks and Atkins. 
Hanks says that “[i]n the everyday use of language, meanings are 
events, not entities.”138 Similarly, in the Oxford Guide to Practical Lex-
icography, Atkins and her coauthor say, “[M]eanings and dictionary 
senses aren’t the same thing at all. Meanings exist in infinite numbers 
of discrete communicative events, while the senses in a dictionary rep-
 
 137. Word Senses, supra note 121, at 32. 
 138. Do Word Meanings Exist?, supra note 113, at 130. 
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resent lexicographers’ attempts to impose some order on this ba-
bel.”139 To be sure, it is “convenient shorthand,” as Hanks puts it, to 
talk about the meanings of words in isolation, as they are set out in 
dictionaries, “but strictly speaking these are not meanings.”140 Rather, 
they are what Hanks calls “‘meaning potentials’—potential contribu-
tions to the meanings of texts and conversations in which the words 
are used, and activated by the speaker who uses them.”141 
Kilgarriff describes dictionary senses, as distinguished from mean-
ings, as representations of a “corpus cluster”—a grouping of corpus 
lines in which the word in question is used in more or less the same 
way.142 Such a cluster is prepared using a KWIC concordance for the 
word in question. The concordance lines are grouped “so that, as far 
as possible, all members of each cluster have much in common with 
each other, and little in common with members of other clusters.”143 
The lexicographer then “works out what it is that makes [each clus-
ter’s] members belong together, reorganising clusters as necessary,” 
and writes up those conclusions “in the highly constrained language 
of a dictionary definition.”144 
The clustering process is an intuitive one. “The lexicographer may 
or may not be explicitly aware of the criteria according to which he or 
she is clustering”; the process of working out what the members of 
each cluster have in common “is just a fallible post hoc attempt to make 
the criteria explicit.”145 And although Kilgarriff describes this process 
in the context of using corpus data, it seems to me that his description 
applies equally to what lexicographers do when they work from old-
fashioned citations.146 
 
 139. THE OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEXICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 311. 
 140. Do Word Meanings Exist?, supra note 113, at 130. 
 141. Id. The concept of meaning potentials is also invoked, though in terms that might be 
slightly different, in Jens Allwood, Meaning Potentials and Context: Some Consequences for the 
Analysis of Variation in Meaning, in COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO LEXICAL SEMANTICS 29 (Hu-
bert Cuyckens et al. eds., 2003). 
 142. “I Don’t Believe in Word Senses,” supra note 16, at 144–45. 
 143. Id. at 145. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Indeed, at least one lexicographer noted during the pre-corpus era that “citations tend 
to fall into what may be called ‘contextual clusters.’” Allen Walker Read, The Relation of Defini-
tions to their Contextual Basis, 39 ETC: REV. GEN. SEMANTICS 318, 319 (1982). 
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All of this points toward the conclusion that rather than think of 
words as having meanings, we should think about words as things that 
are used in order to make meanings.147 And it follows that we should 
make a corresponding adjustment in how we think about dictionary 
definitions and in how we deal with disputes about word meaning. 
The latter topic is one that I will take up in the next, and final, part of 
this Article. 
VI. MUSCARELLO V. UNITED STATES:  
A CORPUS ANALYSIS OF CARRY A FIREARM 
A. The Case 
Muscarello v. United States148 is famous (or should I say infamous?) 
for two things. One is the Supreme Court’s exercise in kinda-sorta 
corpus linguistics. The issue was whether the phrase carry a firearm 
applies to driving somewhere with a gun locked in your glove com-
partment or trunk; in holding that it does, the Court relied on evi-
dence of actual usage showing that carry is sometimes used that way.149 
Stephen Mouritsen has persuasively criticized the Court’s analysis on 
the ground that the Court’s choice of search terms effectively prede-
termined what the data would show.150 He also used corpus data to 
show that the Court got the ordinary meaning of carry wrong, at 
least  if “ordinary meaning” is taken to mean “most-frequently- 
expressed  meaning.”151 
The other point for which Muscarello is known is the Court’s dis-
play of poor dictionary skills: the majority pointed to the first senses 
listed for carry in the Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary as the word’s primary sense, rather than 
 
 147. Patrick Hanks, How People Use Words to Make Meanings: Semantic Types Meet Valen-
cies, in NLPCS 2010: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON NATURAL 
LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE 3 (Bernadette Sharp & Michael Zock 
eds.,  2010). 
 148. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998). 
 149. Id. at 129–30. 
 150. The Dictionary is Not a Fortress, supra note 2, at 1947–48. 
 151. Id. at 1957–66. 
3.GOLDFARB_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT 
DELETE)  4/26/2018  3:58 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1398 
(as is actually the case) its oldest sense.152 Mouritsen skewered the 
Court on this point, too.153 
My purpose here in dealing with Muscarello is to use carry as a 
vehicle for a purely corpus-based analysis of word meaning, drawing 
on a methodology developed by Hanks called Corpus Pattern Analy-
sis. This analysis will differ from Mouritsen’s in that his purpose was 
to decide which of the two dictionary senses that were at issue in Mus-
carello was the more common one. In doing so, he did not, as far as I 
can tell, use the approach that I will follow here. On the other hand, 
my purpose here is more open ended. Rather than adjudicating be-
tween two different word senses, I want to provide an example of cor-
pus analysis in action, in order to show how it works and what it 
can  do. 
First, some necessary background. The defendants in Muscarello 
had been convicted under a statute that mandates the imposition of at 
least five years’ imprisonment on anyone who “during and in relation 
to any crime of . . . drug trafficking . . . uses or carries a firearm.”154 
Each of the defendants had driven to the site of a drug deal with a gun 
in his vehicle; in one case it was in the glove compartment and in the 
other it was in the trunk.155 They each challenged their conviction on 
the theory that their actions had not constituted “carrying” a firearm. 
By a 5–4 vote, the Court rejected that argument.156 
In discussing what the ordinary meaning of carry is, the Court saw 
its job as being to select between two dictionary senses of the word: 
(1) what the Court believed was “the first, or primary, meaning,” un-
der which “one can, as a matter of ordinary English, ‘carry firearms’ 
in a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies,” and 
(2) what the Court described as “a different, rather special” use of the 
word, under which it means “for example, ‘bearing’ or (in slang) 
‘packing’ (as in ‘packing a gun’).”157 
 
 152. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128; see 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxix (2d ed. 
1989); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (Philip Babcock Gove 
ed., 1971). 
 153. The Dictionary is Not a Fortress, supra note 2, at 1930–35. 
 154. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). 
 155. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
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As a check on its reliance on the dictionaries, the Court investi-
gated the usage of carry in news reports “to make certain that there is 
no special ordinary English restriction (unmentioned in dictionaries) 
upon the use of ‘carry’ in respect to guns.” In particular, the Court 
searched the New York Times database in Nexis and the “US News” 
database in Westlaw, looking for “sentences in which the words ‘carry,’ 
‘vehicle,’ and ‘weapon’ (or variations thereof) all appear.” Thousands 
of such sentences were found, many of which were “used to convey 
the meaning at issue here, i.e., the carrying of guns in a car.”158 
The Court also acknowledged that one of the “primary” defini-
tions it relied on “define[d] ‘carry’ as ‘to move while supporting,’ not 
just in a vehicle, but also ‘in one’s hands or arms.” But it said that 
although “one who bears arms on his person ‘carries a weapon, . . . 
one may also ‘carry a weapon’ tied to the saddle of a horse or placed 
in a bag in a car.”159 
B. Corpus Pattern Analysis 
My analysis of the corpus data regarding carry will draw on a 
method developed by Hanks, which he calls Corpus Pattern Analy-
sis (CPA). 
Hanks describes CPA as “a technique for mapping meaning onto 
words in text.”160 Its purpose is to identify and systematically describe 
the different patterns in which words appear, and the meanings asso-
ciated with those patterns, as shown by corpus data.161 CPA does not 
attempt to identify word meanings in isolation; rather, “meanings are 
associated with prototypical contexts.”162 
The process has two steps. The first is essentially a variant on the 
corpus-clustering process that is discussed above. For each word being 
analyzed (referred to here as “the key word”), “[c]oncordance lines 
 
 158. Id. at 129. 
 159. Id. at 130. 
 160. Patrick Hanks, Corpus Pattern Analysis, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH 
EURALEX INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS 87, 87 (Geoffrey Williams & Sandra Vessier eds., 2004) 
[hereinafter Corpus Pattern Analysis]; see also, e.g., LEXICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 15, at  
113–43. 
 161. See Corpus Pattern Analysis, supra note 160, at 87–88. The symbol ≈ is used to indi-
cate that “grammatical” is a rough paraphrase of “syntagmatic,” not an exact synonym. 
 162. Id. at 88. 
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are grouped into semantically motivated syntagmatic [≈grammatical] 
patterns.”163 (I take the description of the patterns as being “semanti-
cally motivated” to mean that each cluster is limited to lines in which 
the pattern is used to express essentially the same meaning. Any such 
semantic sorting presumably takes account of similarities and differ-
ences in the key word’s collocates.) 
In the second step, “a ‘meaning’ [is associated] with each 
pattern . . . in close coordination with the assignment of concordance 
lines to patterns.”164 In dealing with the key word’s collocates, the 
process requires more than just making a list of words. Rather, it in-
volves grouping the collocates into categories, with the categories be-
ing organized into a taxonomy, of which the following is a toy exam-
ple: 
ANYTHING 
- ENTITY 
- - ANIMATE 
- - - HUMAN 
- - - - LITIGANT 
- - - - LAWYER 
- - - NONHUMAN 
- - - - . . . 
- - INANIMATE 
- - INSTITUTION 
- - - - . . . 
- - OTHER 
- - - - . . . 
- EVENTUALITY 
- - EVENT 
- - STATE 
Under the last level of each branch of the taxonomy, when the 
most specific category is reached, would be the set of words that falls 
into that category. And for each pattern, there would typically be pref-
erences for the categories of collocates that would fill a particular 
grammatical slot. For example, for a given pattern, there might be a 
preference for the subject slot to be filled with a noun from the cate-
gory HUMAN. 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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To illustrate what the end result of this process looks like, set out 
below are five patterns associated with the verb need.165 The example 
is taken from the Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs (PDEV), a pro-
ject headed by Hanks, the purpose of which is to list the patterns as-
sociated with each verb in a large corpus (currently, the 100-million-
word British National Corpus).166 These are all the patterns that were 
identified for need. Semantic categories are shown in SMALL CAPITAL 
LETTERS; types of grammatical constructions are shown in brackets. 
Other than formatting changes, the only difference from how the pat-
terns appear on the PDEV website is that in the column containing 
the line labels, I have substituted meaning for implicature, out of con-
sideration for readers unfamiliar with the latter word. 
 Pattern: HUMAN or INSTITUTION needs EVENTUALITY or ENTITY 
 Meaning: HUMAN or INSTITUTION requires that EVENTUALITY or ENTITY must be 
realized or available, in order to accomplish some goal 
 Example:  Even the largest schools may need outside help. 
 Pattern:  ENTITY 1 or EVENTUALITY 1 needs ENTITY 2 or EVENTUALITY 2 
 Meaning:  ENTITY 1 or EVENTUALITY 1 is an essential precondition for or attrib-
ute of ENTITY 2 or EVENTUALITY 2 
 Example:  Punishing people certainly needs a justification, since it is almost 
always something which is harmful, painful or unpleasant to the 
recipient. 
 Pattern:  ENTITY or EVENTUALITY needs [to-infinitive] 
 Meaning:  An essential precondition for the realization of EVENTUALITY is 
that [verb] must be realized 
 Example:  Moreover, labels need not be permanent and irreversible. 
 Pattern:  HUMAN needs [to-infinitive] 
 Meaning:  HUMAN must do [verb] 
 Example:  I need to explain why this was happening in the first place. 
 Pattern:  PLANT or ANIMATE needs EVENTUALITY or STUFF 
 Meaning:  PLANT or ANIMATE must have EVENTUALITY or STUFF in order to sur-
vive and flourish 
 
 165. Patrick Hanks et al., Need, PATTERN DICTIONARY ENG. VERBS, http://pdev.org.uk/ 
#browse?q=need;f=A;v=need (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). 
 166. Patrick Hanks et al., PATTERN DICTIONARY ENG. VERBS, http://pdev. 
org.uk/#browse (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). Out of the 5396 verbs in the corpus, need is one of 
the 1393 that had been completed as of mid-October 2017; analysis of carry had not yet  
begun.  Id. 
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 Example:  I had to have a tracheostomy operation, and from then on I 
needed twenty-four-hour nursing care. 
CPA’s value for both lexicography and legal interpretation lies in 
bringing discipline and structure to the process of investigating mean-
ing. It forces one to focus on the two aspects of context that are most 
important: the specific grammatical structure that is at issue, and the 
semantic characteristics of the key collocates of the word in question. 
In discussing Muscarello, the grammatical structure is the transitive-
verb construction: verb plus noun phrase. The important collocates 
are the words that serve as the verb’s subject (denoting the entity do-
ing the carrying) and as its direct object (denoting what is being car-
ried). But a different case might involve some other grammatical con-
struction, with its own set of semantic characteristics.167 The 
important  point is that CPA provides a framework for organizing the  
corpus analysis. 
C. Analyzing the Corpus Data 
1. Framing the inquiry 
The verb carry is often used in ways that are irrelevant to the stat-
ute at issue in Muscarello. People can carry diseases, as can birds and 
other animals. Products carry warnings, television networks carry pro-
grams and ads, crimes carry penalties, fiber optic cables carry data. So 
it was necessary to identify the characteristics that distinguish the kind 
of carrying prohibited by § 924(c) from those other kinds. 
This is where my analysis was informed by CPA. In particular, I 
used the idea of semantically categorizing the collocates of the verb. 
Deciding on the appropriate categories was easy. The statute prohibits 
actions by humans, and firearms are tangible objects, so the relevant 
corpus lines would be those that denoted the carrying of tangible ob-
jects by humans. Thus, we have the initial categories HUMAN and 
OBJECT, and the basic conceptual schema HUMAN CARRY OBJECT. 
Within the set of corpus lines instantiating that schema, I was in-
terested in seeing what was indicated by each line with respect to the 
 
 167. See, e.g., Neal Goldfarb, The Semantics of Sleeping in Railway Stations, 
LAWNLINGUISTICS (June 5, 2017), https://lawnlinguistics.com/2017/06/05/the-seman 
tics-of-sleeping-in-railway-stations/. 
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manner in which the object was carried: in the person’s hands or arms, 
strapped to their back, in the trunk of their car, and so on. Therefore, 
I attempted to categorize the manner of carrying that was reflected in 
each concordance line that denoted the carrying of a tangible object 
by a human. I set up two categories, each one corresponding to a sep-
arate subschema: HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE, which encom-
passed events analogous to those in Muscarello and HUMAN CARRY 
OBJECT, which covered everything else. 
There were two ways in which the concordance line might provide 
the information needed for this categorization. The first is that the 
information might be linguistically encoded: 
carried a hacksaw blade in his toolbox 
he was carrying it behind the seat of his pick-up. 
Alternatively, the necessary information may be inferred, with varying 
degrees of specificity, from the context: 
Lindsay was going up the stairs, carrying a ceramic teacup 
She drives her car and carries her dogs places and goes to openings of clubs. 
. . . seem underfoot, a noise clicked. Wood on rock, like a rifle butt carried 
too  low. 
There was also a separate issue that I wanted to explore. Carry is 
sometimes used in sentences in which the subject noun denotes  
a vehicle: 
There is a distinct possibility that the truck was carrying a back-up tacti-
cal  rocket 
still trying to determine if a second man helped rent a truck believed to have 
carried the bomb. 
They’re walking perhaps a hundred yards or so to a car waiting to carry them 
into Cape Town. 
One might argue that uses like these support the Court’s holding in 
Muscarello, since the schema VEHICLE CARRY is similar to CARRY IN A 
VEHICLE. But on the other hand, such uses are impersonal—the no-
tion of a person doing the carrying is not expressly encoded in the text 
and is not otherwise brought within the reader’s focus of attention. 
Given that I didn’t know in advance whether this kind of use would 
be relevant, I kept track of it separately, using a category correspond-
ing to the schema VEHICLE CARRY OBJECT. 
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2. The data 
The data that I analyzed came from the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA).168 The corpus contains just over 100,000 
separate instances of the lemma carry being used as a verb. Lemma is 
the word used in lexicography and corpus linguistics to refer collec-
tively to all the forms of a given word. Therefore, the 100,000+  
instances of the lemma carry (also referred to as “tokens”) include 
tokens of the word forms carry, carries, carried, and carrying. I should 
also add that some of the tokens of carry and carries are in fact uses 
of the word as a noun that are incorrectly tagged in the corpus 
as verbs. 
I obviously looked at only a small fraction of all the tokens of 
carry. I looked individually at 901 concordance lines, which I believe 
is enough data to provide a reliable picture of how carry behaves.169 
These concordance lines were gathered by means of several differ-
ent searches: 
• 400 lines resulted from two lemmatized KWIC searches on 
carry, each returning 200 lines. (There was no overlap be-
tween the two sets of results.) In order to provide a look at the 
behavior of carry in general, these searches did not require the 
presence of any particular collocates. 
• An additional 299 lines resulted from a series of collocate 
searches calling for corpus lines in which various vehicle-re-
lated search terms occurred within four words after the lemma 
carry: car (100 lines); truck (99); seat, backseat, or frontseat 
(48); trunk (41); and glovebox, glove, or compartment (11). 
Given that the collocates in these searches either denote a type 
of vehicle (car, truck) or denote things that are to varying de-
grees associated with vehicles, it might be expected that corpus 
lines that contained any of these collocations would have a 
 
 168. COCA, supra note 28, http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). 
 169. In the compilation of the Pattern Dictionary of English Verbs, 250 corpus lines are 
typically analyzed for each verb. See DVC: Disambiguation of Verbs by Collocation, RES. GROUP 
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS, http://rgcl.wlv.ac.uk/research/dvc-disambiguation-of-verbs-
by-collocation/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2018). In addition, the Oxford Guide to Practical Lexicog-
raphy states that lexical-profiling software, which partially automates the corpus-analysis process, 
“only works well for lemmas with at least 500 hits[.]” OXFORD GUIDE TO PRACTICAL LEX-
ICOGRAPHY, supra note 12, at 61. Therefore, 902 corpus lines seems adequate. 
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higher-than-random probability of falling within the category 
HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE. As we will see, that is ex-
actly what the data showed. 
• I ran several collocate searches calling for lines in which carry 
collocated (within a four-word span in either direction) with 
gun, pistol, firearm, rifle, or shotgun. I did two searches limited 
to 100 lines each, one in which the collocate terms were sin-
gular and the other in which they were plural. 
The data from all these searches can be found in the appendix to this 
Article, which is available online.170 
3. Analysis 
a. Summary. The most important conclusion is that corpus lines 
categorized as HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE—i.e., those corre-
sponding to the defendants’ conduct in Muscarello—were greatly out-
numbered by those categorized as simply HUMAN CARRY OBJECT. 
Moreover, my reading of the corpus lines in the latter category is that 
all of them involve people carrying things in their arms, in their hands, 
in bags and suitcases, slung over their shoulders, and so on. And that 
was clear even though in the great majority of cases, the manner of 
carrying was not expressly encoded. In those cases, the manner of car-
rying had to be inferred from the nature of the event and surrounding 
circumstances as described in the text. All of which gives reason to 
believe that phrases following the pattern [human] carry [object] are 
not used to express the meaning HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE 
unless the IN VEHICLE part is explicitly encoded or otherwise sup-
ported by something in the context. 
That said, when you look at a concordance limited to uses in which 
carry is collocated with words denoting firearms, some uncertainty 
creeps in. It’s not that there are more uses falling into the category of 
HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE; the proportion of such uses is 
comparable to the proportion of such uses in general. However, 
within the subcategory HUMAN CARRY FIREARM, there are a signifi-
cant number of uses that feel to me like they are more amenable to an 
interpretation that would support the holding in Muscarello. 
 
 170. Neal Goldfarb, A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning in the Framework of Corpus  Lin-
guistics (Appendix) (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039015.  
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b. The use of carry in general. Because of the special issues that arise 
with respect to uses in which carry is collocated with words like gun, 
pistol, and rifle, I will focus first only on the corpus lines that resulted 
from the two KWIC searches and from the searches involving vehicle-
related collocates. Those searches yielded a total of 699 corpus lines, 
which broke down as follows: 
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Human  
carry object 
Human carry 
 object in vehicle 
Vehicle  
carry object 
 
Other 
 
Total 
KWIC (note 1) 124 2 24 250 400 
car 53 5 19 23 100 
truck (note 2) 26 8 52 13 99 
seat, backseat, frontseat 27 7 3 11 48 
trunk 20 11 3 7 41 
glovebox, glove, compartment 
(note 2) 
2 5  4 11 
Total 252 38 101 308 699 
 
Notes: 
1. The results from the KWIC search included four lines in which carry was used, without a direct 
object, to denote carrying a gun (e.g., “cabdrivers who are tested and trained to carry and protect 
themselves”). These are includedunder “other,” as are six lines that were unlear or ambiguous. 
2. The results on these rows for HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE include a few corpus lines that were 
ambiguous between HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE and VEHICLE CARRY OBJECT. I counted them toward 
the former reading so as to give the Muscarello majority the benefit of the doubt. 
3. There were a few corpus lines in which I interpreted carry as being used as being generally syn-
onymous with accompany or escort, a usage peculiar to American Southern dialect. These are in-
cluded under “Other.” 
 
 
Overall, the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE pattern ac-
counted for 15.4% of the corpus lines that involved humans carrying 
tangible objects, either in a vehicle or otherwise, and 11.4% of the all 
of corpus lines that referred to the carrying of a tangible object 
(whether by a human in any manner or in a vehicle). Thus, the HUMAN 
CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE pattern represented only a small minority 
of the relevant corpus lines. However, these figures almost certainly 
overstate the actual frequency of the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN 
VEHICLE pattern, since they include the results of the searches that 
included vehicle-related collocates. As I said above, that category is 
likely to include a higher-than-average proportion of lines fitting the 
pattern. And that prediction is borne out by the data. Looking only at 
the vehicle-related collocate searches, 17.7% of all lines referring to 
the carrying of a tangible object fit the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN 
VEHICLE pattern, compared to only 1.4% for the KWIC searches by 
themselves. The KWIC results are presumably more representative of 
carry’s overall behavior. In contrast to that low percentage, 79.5% of 
the KWIC results that involved the carrying of a tangible object fit the 
HUMAN CARRY OBJECT pattern. So if the KWIC data is taken as being 
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representative, the frequency of that pattern is roughly fifty-seven 
times that of the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE pattern. 
With respect to the both the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT and the 
HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE categories, I looked to see how 
often the manner of carrying was explicitly encoded. Each category’s 
results were virtually the mirror-image of the other’s. Within the 
HUMAN CARRY OBJECT category, the great majority of lines did not 
encode the manner in which the object was carried, leaving that fact 
to be inferred. The opposite was true of the category HUMAN CARRY 
OBJECT IN VEHICLE; most of the uses in that category did explicitly 
encode the fact that the object was being carried in a vehicle, as in the 
following examples: 
He dug out the flashlight he carried in the glove box and clicked it on. 
. . . no reason to keep carrying stuff in our trunk 
Two were charged with stripping parts from a parked car and three with car-
rying a sawed-off shotgun and drugs in a car, police said. 
In the front seat, I’m carrying a gadget slightly larger than an electric shaver. 
In all but one of the remaining lines, the manner-of-carrying in-
formation was partially encoded, by which I mean that there were ex-
plicit references to vehicles (underlined in the examples below), which 
prompted inferences that the object was carried in that vehicle: 
Shagren said what sparked the proclamation was concern over truck drivers 
carrying dairy products not being able to drive more than 12 hours a day 
. . . 
He was thrown into the back of a deuce-and-a-half truck and carried south in 
a pile of wounded and dying men . . . 
We returned with the truck to carry loot for the soldiers, mainly furniture. 
Only one corpus line instantiating the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN 
VEHICLE schema did not explicitly refer to a vehicle, but even that line 
can be understood as referring to vehicles by implication: 
and the other delivery men at Yasgur’s were planning to carry milk to the 
hordes, while my mother would help the Ladies 
What all of this shows, I think, is not only that the pattern [hu-
man] carry [object] is seldom used to refer to events in which the ob-
ject is carried in a vehicle, but also that the pattern is not used to  
express that meaning without the text or utterance containing some 
kind of overt indication to that effect. 
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I haven’t yet discussed the results for corpus lines categorized as 
VEHICLE CARRY OBJECT—i.e., those in which the subject noun de-
noted the vehicle in which the object was carried. This pattern was less 
frequent than the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT pattern. Overall, the num-
ber of VEHICLE CARRY uses was 26.4% of the combined HUMAN 
CARRY uses. But that figure includes the results from the collocate 
searches, which would be expected to overrepresent VEHICLE CARRY 
uses in comparison to the entire corpus. Looking only at the KWIC 
results, for which no collocates were specified, the number of VEHICLE 
CARRY uses was roughly 19.2% of the number of HUMAN CARRY uses. 
The VEHICLE CARRY category also included more corpus lines 
than did HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE. The size of the former 
was 237% of the size of the latter overall (including the results from 
the collocate searches), and was 1500% the size of the former when 
only the KWIC searches are considered. 
Even when both vehicle-related categories are combined, the total 
number of corpus lines was smaller than the number for the HUMAN 
CARRY OBJECT category. The combined size of the vehicle-related cat-
egories was 37.8% of the size of the HUMAN CARRY CATEGORY overall, 
and 20.5% when considering only the KWIC searches. 
Thus, the data supports the following generalizations. First, carry 
is used more frequently to talk about acts of personally carrying ob-
jects (for instance, in one’s hands or arms, or strapped to one’s back), 
than about events in which objects are transported or carried in a ve-
hicle. That may or may not suggest that the former use is more “basic” 
or “primary” than the latter, but it certainly does not suggest  
the opposite. 
Second, when people do talk about objects being carried in vehi-
cles, they are significantly more likely to do so using the impersonal 
pattern [vehicle] carry [object] than to use the pattern [human] carry 
[object] in [vehicle]. This difference in frequency might suggest that 
the two patterns differ in their meanings to at least some extent, be-
cause if their meanings were the same, one might expect their relative 
frequencies to be more similar. Before reaching a more definite con-
clusion, I would want to do some research into the relationship be-
tween frequency and similarity of meaning. But my initial inclination 
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would be to separate these two categories into separate corpus clusters 
and therefore to treat them as separate senses.171 
In short, the data that has been examined so far weighs against the 
majority’s interpretation in Muscarello.  
c. Carry collocated with words denoting firearms. I turn now to the 
results of my searches for corpus lines in which carry is collocated with 
what I will refer to as “firearm collocates.”172 As with the results that 
are discussed above, this category included only a handful of lines re-
ferred to firearms being carried in vehicles. These represented about 
2.4% of the lines that were relevant to the analysis (meaning the lines 
instantiating the pattern [human] carry [firearm]). However, there 
were also some notable differences, some of which might provide a 
nonfrivolous basis for arguing in support of the result in Muscarello. 
The first difference is one that affected how I structured my anal-
ysis, but turned out not to affect my ultimate conclusions. In roughly 
15% of the relevant firearm-collocate corpus lines, carry was used as 
part of a statement about the permissibility or legality of carrying  
firearms. These uses, which I labeled as DEONTIC,173 included  
the following: 
Representative Charles Collins, who sponsored legislation in Little Rock that 
allows gun owners to carry their weapons to church . . . . 
Wisconsin has become one of the most progressive states now for owning a 
gun and carrying concealed weapons. . . . 
 
 171. That is how these patterns are treated in Cobuild, but with the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT 
pattern being split into two senses. Here are the relevant entries from the first edition of the 
Cobuild dictionary:  
1 If you carry something, you hold it or support it so that it does not touch the 
ground, and take it with you as you go somewhere. 
. . . 
3 When a vehicle carries people, they travel inside it from one place to another. 
4 If you carry something with you, you have it with you wherever you go, for 
example by keeping it in your pocket or in your handbag. 
COBUILD1, supra note 44, at 208 (examples omitted; boldface in original). 
 172. I should note that as a result of additional analysis that I undertook in September and 
October 2017, the discussion here and in that appendix goes beyond what was in the draft of 
this Article that was posted on SSRN in February 2017 and the revised version that was posted 
in September of the same year. In addition, some of the coding has been changed. However, the 
underlying data is the same. 
 173. See, e.g., Monica Bucciarellia & P.N. Johnson-Laird, Naïve Deontics: A Theory of 
Meaning, Representation, and Reasoning, 50 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 159 (2005). 
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killed a bill that would have allowed Tennesseans to openly carry guns with-
out a permit and several other gun-related proposals . . . . 
Uses such as these arguably should not be considered as part of an 
inquiry into ordinary meaning, since they occur in a context having 
legal overtones. Ordinary meaning is generally regarded as (among 
other things) nontechnical meaning,174 but common words are some-
times used in a technical legal sense.175 When the pattern [human] 
carry [firearm] appears in a deontic expression, one has to consider 
the possibility that in any given case, its meaning is influenced to some 
extent by how the pattern is used in legal texts. I tend to think that 
any corpus lines reflecting such an influence should be excluded from 
the ordinary-meaning analysis. However, it will not be easy to reliably 
identify such uses. So rather than wrestling with that problem, I de-
cided to tally the results for such uses separately from the other rele-
vant uses. 
The second difference displayed by the firearm-collocate results 
was that unlike the overwhelming majority of the other relevant cor-
pus lines that were reviewed, a substantial number of the lines involv-
ing firearm collocates could be read as being not inconsistent with the 
schema HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE. And that was the case 
regardless of whether the lines classified as deontic were counted: 
roughly 13.1% of the non-deontic lines were coded as being not in-
consistent with the HUMAN CARRY OBJECT IN VEHICLE schema, and 
about 10.7% of all the relevant lines.176 
Thus, a significant number of corpus lines could be understood as 
being not inconsistent with the interpretation in Muscarello. That is 
the strongest piece of corpus evidence supporting that interpretation. 
But I do not want to overstate the strength of that evidence. My de-
scription of these corpus lines as being “not inconsistent” with the 
 
 174. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008); Nix v. Hed-
den, 149 U.S. 304, 306–07 (1893); WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON 
HOW TO READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 60 (2016); Frederick Schauer, Is Law a 
Technical Language?, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501 (2015) (hereinafter Is Law a Tech- 
nical Language?). 
 175. See, e.g., Is Law a Technical Language?, supra note 174, at 502. 
 176. The remaining of the lines were divided into two groups. With respect to about 41% 
of the relevant non-deontic lines, I was reasonably confident that the carrying of firearms in 
vehicles was not involved. (If the deontic lines were factored in, that percentage decreased to 
about 34%.) As to a smaller but still significant number of lines (24% of the non-deontic lines, 
and 20% overall), I leaned in that direction but with more uncertainty. 
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Muscarello is wishy-washy on purpose. In saying that such an interpre-
tation is not ruled out, I do not mean to suggest that it is the most 
natural reading. 
Third, unlike most if not all of the corpus lines that are discussed 
in the previous section, many of the corpus lines involving firearm col-
locates, referred to the carrying of firearms generally, as a type of ac-
tion, rather than to a particular instance of a firearm being carried. 
Within that group of lines, there were two subgroups. In one of them, 
the AGENT (the person referred to as doing the carrying) was de-
scribed as a specific person, so that the reference was to the general 
actions of a specific person. In others, the reference was to the carrying 
of firearms by people in general or by members of a particular category 
of people. Thus, the lines could be categorized as (1) general as to 
both the agent and as to the carrying, (2) specific as to the agent but 
general as to the carrying, or (3) specific as to both the agent and the 
carrying. There were no examples in which specific events of carrying 
did not involve the actions of a specific agent. That is not surprising; 
it is not possible for a specific carrying event to occur without the 
action of carrying being the act of a specific person. 
 The lines that were general as to both the agent and the action 
of carrying included the following:  
the current law, which allows gun owners to openly carry rifles but generally 
prohibits openly displayed sidearms. 
In response to the increasing number of people carrying guns inside their 
stores, Chipotle and Starbucks recently asked customers to refrain from 
Hawken is a replica of the rifles the mountain men carried. It comes in.50-
caliber percussion or flintlock versions. $637, percussion; 
Lines that involved a specific agent but were general as to the carrying 
included these:  
Lisa’s turnaround began two years ago when she inadvertently brought the 
gun she carried to work for protection onto school property in her 
mother’s car, she said 
That’s easy. If they want to carry a rifle, they can carry mine. 
was in the thick of the action. He says he got the rifle he carries now in hand-
to-hand combat. . . . 
Finally, the following lines involved specific acts of carrying by spe-
cific agents:  
border when the Marines said he fired at them with the.22-caliber rifle he was 
carrying. . . . 
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Early in grouse season last year, Hank had slipped. The shotgun he was  
carrying had the safety off. He tumbled forward and the gun went  
off, spraying 
Out of the 164 lines that I identified as involving relevant uses, about 
68% were general as to the agent, the carrying, or both.  
This distinction between specific and general references strikes me 
as being significant primarily because it illustrates the kind of unex-
pected insight that corpus analysis can provide into how words are 
used. Considered on its own, I do not think it does much to support 
the holding in Muscarello. However, some of the lines that were coded 
as general in one respect or another could arguably provide the hold-
ing with some qualitative support.  
While most of the HUMAN carry OBJECT lines in the KWIC and 
vehicle-related searches involved carrying the object for the purpose 
of moving it from one place to another, many of those in the firearms-
related searches probably refer to carrying firearms for the purpose of 
keeping them with you at all times, like carrying a wallet or carrying 
keys (which the Cobuild dictionaries treat as a separate sense177): 
. . .In response to the increasing number of people carrying guns inside their 
stores, Chipotle and Starbucks recently asked customers to refrain from 
. . .For many of the women who are carrying guns, the appeal is not a sym-
bolic demonstration of their Second Amendment rights 
. . .macho world, a city ruled by guns, whether carried by Somalis or United 
Nations soldiers. 
These uses could arguably be clustered together with carrying a wallet 
and carrying keys, and therefore be covered by the separate sense that 
Cobuild provides for those uses. While that does not directly suggest 
that driving with a gun in the glove compartment counts as carrying 
the gun, it felt to me that in these lines, there was a diminution of the 
element of physical contact and manipulation that is inherent in uses 
such as these:  
They moved stiffly, because the guns they carried under their sport coats or 
in the waistbands of their pants were uncomfortable and 
Most are armed with rifles, mainly carried on their shoulders 
Moreover, some of the lines that were coded as general conveyed 
an overtone similar to what is conveyed by this definition of carry arms 
or weapons from the 6th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “To wear, 
 
 177. See COBUILD1, supra note 44, at 208. 
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bear or carry them upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, 
for the purpose of use, or for the purpose of being armed and ready 
for offensive or defensive action in case of a conflict with another per-
son.” 178 And while this definition focuses on carrying something 
“upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket,” it is common for 
an expression to be used in a way that is related to an earlier use, but 
with the earlier meaning being broadened (and possibly weakened). 179 
Therefore, the kind of use described by the Black’s definition might 
be extended to contexts in which the purpose for carrying the gun is 
the same but the gun is not kept on one’s person. Indeed, the dissent 
in Muscarello seemed to say that it would constitute carrying a firearm 
for the driver of a car to have a loaded gun accessible on the seat next 
to them.180 And a similar interpretation was endorsed by Judge 
Kozinski, who justified it by appealing to something similar to the kind 
of broadening that I have described: 
The key aspect of the narrow definition is not that the weapon actu-
ally be borne on the person. Rather, it is that the weapon remain 
within easy reach while the individual is in motion. Where an indi-
vidual is walking, a gun in hand certainly amounts to carrying, but 
so does a gun in a holster or a shopping bag. The essence is that the 
weapon moves with the person and can be swiftly put to use. Where 
the individual is in a car, he need not actually be touching the 
weapon to make it move with him. [Footnote: The car might be 
thought of as a large, self-propelled shopping bag containing both 
the gun and the individual.] Because the car and its contents move 
in unison, any weapon that is within hand’s reach while the car is in 
motion can be said to be carried. The same would be true, of course, 
if the individual had the weapon concealed in a train compartment, 
a bus or, heaven forfend, an airplane.181  
Overall, however, these attempts to tease out overtones from cor-
pus data turn on distinctions that are impressionistic and probably too 
delicate to make a difference to a judge. Nevertheless, discussing them 
 
 178. Carry Arms or Weapons, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990). 
 179. See, e.g., PHILIP DURKIN, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO ETYMOLOGY 235–37 (2009); 
DONKA MINKOVA & ROBERT STOCKWELL, ENGLISH WORDS: HISTORY & STRUCTURE 172–77 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 180. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 147 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 181. United States v. Foster, 133 F.3d 704, 706 (9th Cir.) (footnote omitted), vacated, 
525 U.S. 801 (1998). 
3.GOLDFARB_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2018  3:58 PM 
1359 A Lawyer’s Introduction to Meaning . . .  
 1415 
has hopefully given some additional sense of what corpus analysis 
can  do.  
d. A new insight. Putting aside whatever bearing the corpus data 
may have on the issue in Muscarello, it nevertheless is interesting for 
what it tells us about word meaning and the shortcomings of diction-
ary definitions. The data reveals shades of meaning that are not re-
flected in any dictionary I’m aware of and that, as far as I know, have 
never before been remarked on. One question this raises is whether 
the uses I’ve focused on should be regarded as instantiating a separate 
sense of carry. 
But that question has no single right answer. Rather, the answer 
depends on what level of granularity is thought to be appropriate, and 
that in turn depends on what aspect of the meaning of carry a [fire-
arm] is in question.  
This resonates with a point that was made by Adam Kilgarriff—a 
point that I didn’t fully appreciate until after completing my corpus 
analysis of carry: “[A] task-independent set of word senses for a lan-
guage is not a coherent concept. Word senses are simply undefined 
unless there is some underlying rationale for clustering, some context 
which classifies some distinctions as worth making and others as not 
worth making.” 182  
This statement was made with respect to word-sense disambigua-
tion in the field of Natural Language Processing, but I think it applies 
to lexicography and legal interpretation as well. In writing definitions 
that will appear in dictionaries, lexicographers know that the diction-
ary will be consulted by all kinds of different people who are looking 
for all kinds of different information about all kinds of different words. 
This compels a one-size-fits-all approach to definition-writing. But 
there is no reason to think that the level of granularity at which a dic-
tionary is written is one that will best serve the needs of a particular 
legal issue. This is yet another way in which dictionaries are inadequate 
to the demands of legal interpretation. 
VII. CONCLUSION: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A LINGUIST 
I said at the beginning of this Article that the importance of corpus 
linguistics for legal interpretation goes beyond mere methodology. I 
 
 182. “I Don’t Believe in Word Senses,” supra note 16, at 150. 
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have tried to show that corpus linguistics has generated insights about 
language and meaning that call into question some of the assumptions 
underlying the way that judges and lawyers deal with issues of word 
meaning. Indeed, one of the things that is called into question is the 
phrase word meaning itself. The relevant unit of meaning in many 
cases will be more than a single word: a phrase or some other multi-
word expression. But at this point, what needs to be addressed is 
the  nature of the appropriate analysis; questions of labeling can wait  
until later. 
Although the significance of corpus linguistics is not limited to 
methodology, neither is it purely theoretical. It opens up new ways of 
thinking about issues of (what I will continue to call) word meaning: 
new kinds of questions to ask, new modes of analysis, and new lines of 
argument for litigators to pursue. And these new ways of thinking turn 
out to have methodological implications. We’ve seen that in the use 
of Corpus Pattern Analysis in reexamining the issue that divided the 
Supreme Court in Muscarello. 
What this means (or rather, one of the things that it means) is that 
if we want corpus linguistics to fulfill its potential for enriching legal 
interpretation, simply teaching lawyers and judges how to run corpus 
searches will not be enough. Intelligently doing corpus analysis will in 
some cases require a little grounding in relevant ideas from linguistics, 
such as those that I have discussed here. It will be incumbent on those 
of us who advocate the use of corpus linguistics to develop materials 
that can provide that grounding. Because thinking like a lawyer will 
sometimes require the ability to think like a linguist. 
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